In the early morning of October 26, Israel launched the single largest military attack on Iranian territory since the Iran-Iraq war. The attack came nearly a month after Iran’s October 1 ballistic missile strikes on Israel, dubbed “Operation True Promise 2.” The escalation of continued direct military strikes on each other’s territory indicated a shift in the Israel-Iran conflict dynamics, as both countries repeatedly test previously held red lines.
Israel’s military operation was initially framed as limited by both Israeli and Iranian officials. However, Iran’s attempts to deter Israel through direct attacks have proven counterproductive, instead revealing gaps in its own defenses that Israel is increasingly willing to target. Rather than resolve the ongoing animosity, Israel’s retaliation likely places Iran in an even more precarious position than before October 1.
Iran and Israel have long been engaged in the so-called “campaign between wars,” in which both have engaged in covert strikes and proxy warfare. After Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, the campaign between wars escalated. The subsequent months saw a series of high-profile assassinations by Israel targeting key figures in the so-called Resistance Axis, Iran’s network of non-state allies and proxies, as well as senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders. These actions brought the conflict between Iran and Israel out of the shadows and into open confrontation.
After Israel’s bombing of the Iranian consulate in Damascus last April, Iran’s response marked Iran’s first direct military strike against Israel from its own territory. This was intended to establish a new equation in the conflict—one in which Israeli actions against Iranian interests would be met with Iranian military retaliation. Yet, despite the scale of the operation, Israeli strikes continued in the following months, including strikes against Iranian interests in Syria and the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran. The assassination of Hezbollah’s secretary general Hassan Nasrallah and IRGC brigadier general Abbas Nilforoushan on September 27 dealt a significant blow to Iran’s alliance network, demonstrating that the deterrence sought by Iran had not materialized as planned.
With limited warning, Tehran launched its second direct attack against Israel on October 1. This marked a stark departure from the April operation in both its execution and scale. Unlike the earlier strike, which employed a mix of ballistic missiles, drones, and cruise missiles, the October attack was conducted exclusively with ballistic missiles, which was likely intended to reduce advance detection and limit the effectiveness of Israel’s defenses.
In a video statement immediately following the attack, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu vowed to exact reprisals, stating, “Iran made a big mistake tonight—and it will pay for it.” Although Israel initially considered a stronger response, targeting high-value sites such as nuclear or energy infrastructure, the plan was recalibrated due to U.S. pressure to avoid escalation. Additionally, the U.S. deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) was potentially an incentive for Israel to focus its retaliation primarily on military sites, while adding a layer of defense in anticipation of Iranian retaliation.
Prior to the Israeli attack, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi launched a diplomatic mission to rally regional support against allowing Israel’s use of neighboring airspace. Araghchi’s outreach included Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iraq, Oman, Jordan, Egypt, and Turkey, including states with traditionally tense relations with Iran, such as Jordan, Egypt, and Bahrain. Though Israel notably avoided Jordanian and Saudi airspace, Iran’s diplomatic outreach ultimately could not prevent an Israeli response.
In its strikes of October 26, Israel claimed to have used over 100 aircraft, including advanced F-15 and F-35 jets. Flying over 2,000 kilometers from Israel, these aircraft allegedly launched air launched ballistic missiles, which are much more challenging than surface-to-surface ballistic missiles for air defenses to intercept.
The initial strike wave aimed at dismantling Iranian air defenses, with the Israelis targeting air defenses in Iraq and Syria before launching their ballistic missiles deep into Iranian territory. Conducted from Syrian and Iraqi airspace, with some strikes occurring close to the Iraq-Iran border, the operation was followed by two subsequent waves. These additional strikes zeroed in on military sites and missile production facilities, particularly those involved in solid-propellant manufacturing.
While it is too early to fully assess the extent of damage to Iranian facilities, it is reasonable to conclude that Israel’s strike was largely effective, given the relative superiority of Israeli fighter jets and the difficulties of intercepting air-launched ballistic missiles. Reports indicated that the Israelis targeted four of Iran’s S-300 air defense batteries—its most advanced systems—positioned to protect Tehran and critical nuclear and energy infrastructure. Additionally, the strikes appear to have hit key bottlenecks in Iran’s missile production capabilities. Beyond missile-related targets, Israeli aircraft also targeted a drone production facility and conducted a “symbolic” strike on a building at the Parchin complex associated with Iran’s previous nuclear weapons research and development. The attack also resulted in the death of four soldiers from Iran’s regular military, Artesh
As the attack unfolded, Iranian television downplayed the extent of the attack. State-led media claimed Israeli airstrikes caused only limited damage, countering that Israel’s claims of hitting 20 targets with 100 planes were exaggerated and unrealistic. Additionally, Iranian media shared footage from cities across the country to stress that daily life, including school activities, continued as usual. The Iranian Air Defense Command acknowledged that Israel targeted military centers in Tehran, Khuzestan, and Ilam provinces, but highlighted its success in intercepting the incoming missiles, limiting the impact on the ground.
Even though Iran’s rhetoric downplayed the extent of damage, state institutions also vowed retribution. The IRGC-affiliated Tasnim news agency, quoting “informed sources,” reported that Iran was prepared to respond to Israeli aggression and, without a doubt, Israel would receive a proportionate response to the action taken against Iran. The next day, Iran’s Foreign Ministry condemned Israel’s attacks on its military facilities as “violations of international law and the United Nations Charter,” asserting Iran’s “right and duty to defend against foreign aggression” under Article 51. The Foreign Ministry’s statement linked Israel’s “ongoing occupation, illegal actions, and crimes” against Palestinians and Lebanon, enabled by U.S. and Western support, as the main sources of regional instability. Iran’s General Staff echoed this, emphasizing its defensive success and Iran’s “legal and legitimate right to respond at an appropriate time,” while calling for “a lasting ceasefire in Gaza and Lebanon” to protect defenseless civilians.
Efforts by both Iranian and Israeli officials to underscore the “limited” nature of the operation obscure the likelihood that these attacks were neither as limited nor as deescalatory as portrayed. Although the strikes targeted military facilities, the significant damage to Iran’s air defenses leaves Tehran more vulnerable to further Israeli action against high-value targets such as nuclear and energy infrastructure. Iran’s October attacks may have strained Israel’s air defenses but the U.S. deployment of THAAD seems to have offered Israel some respite. In contrast, Israel’s operation appears to have highlighted Iran’s crucial vulnerability in defense of its territory.
Israel may also have, critically, impacted Iran’s missile production capacity. The ability to produce missiles at a rapid rate was a way of deterring attacks directly against Iran. However, Israel targeted facilities with components essential to missile assembly, such as mixers, that are notoriously difficult for Iran to procure due to stringent international sanctions and export controls. Early satellite imagery revealed that Israel had destroyed solid-propellant missile production facilities at Parchin, Khojir, and Shahroud. Even though Iran’s missile production facilities are dispersed across the country, the destruction or disabling of these resources would set back Iran’s missile manufacturing efforts, with some Israeli and U.S. sources claiming they will need a year to recoup.
If damage assessments are at the high end, Iran’s ability to defend itself and project power regionally could be significantly curtailed in the coming months. On the other hand, if damage assessments lean toward the low end, this could be a positive indicator for limiting an escalatory response, but it is unlikely to halt the ongoing cycle of reprisals between Israel and Iran. Uncertainty remains regarding the full scope of the impact, with Iran’s security landscape depending heavily on how quickly—or if—its defense infrastructure can be restored.
The pressing question now is how, if it all, Iran will respond. Iran’s grand strategy of coordinating multiple fronts against Israel through its proxy network has largely failed to materialize effectively. Instead, Israel has been able to methodically address each challenge sequentially—containing Hamas in Gaza, managing Hezbollah in Lebanon, and now striking Iran itself—while maintaining a degree of operational freedom. More fundamentally, the weakening of Iran’s Axis of Resistance network has stripped away its external defensive layers, leaving Tehran increasingly isolated and exposed. Meanwhile, Iran’s missile arsenal proved both limited in scope and questionable in its reliability.
Iran’s response options are now severely constrained. Restraint could be seen domestically and internationally as a concession that would erode Iran’s credibility. Iran may prefer to seek a diplomatic solution that avoids the further degradation of Hezbollah, potentially offering its closest non-state partner respite to rebuild, while also increasing the pressure for a ceasefire in Gaza. Notably, Israel avoided targeting Iran’s national infrastructure or nuclear sites, possibly signaling a desire to limit the conflict’s scope and avert a broader escalation. Even if the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, opts to deescalate, Iran’s security doctrine—centered on proxy forces, ballistic missile capabilities, and a nuclear program—remains vulnerable. One of the lessons after the Haniyeh killing was that inaction could be costly. Any appearance of backing down could be interpreted as weakness both within Iran and across the region, potentially encouraging further Israeli operations.
A direct military retaliation could attempt to demonstrate resolve, but given the potential damage to Iran’s air defenses and missile production capabilities, such action might invite an even more devastating Israeli counterstrike. This risk is particularly acute given the approaching U.S. election, in which a potential Donald Trump victory could further embolden Israeli action against Iran’s nuclear facilities. Furthermore, escalation could jeopardize efforts to secure ceasefires in Lebanon and Gaza, where Iran has already seen its influence diminish through the attrition of local allies.
Iran’s response options extend beyond direct military retaliation against Israel, but each carries its own complications. Tehran could choose to concentrate on rebuilding Hezbollah’s capabilities or activating other allies or proxies in more limited ways. However, the damage to Iran’s own missile production infrastructure may force a painful prioritization: whether to focus limited resources on reconstituting its domestic capabilities or supporting its regional alliance network. In the long-term, Iran will likely lean toward closer cooperation with Russian on the military front—even opting potentially for joint missile production on Russian territory.
A silver lining for Iran may be the success of its recent regional outreach, as Israel appears to have used only Iraqi airspace, where U.S. coalition forces are stationed, to conduct its attack. This likely reinforces the value of Iran’s rapprochement with Saudi Arabia and broader diplomatic efforts in the region. It is notable that Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, and the secretary general of the Gulf Cooperation Council issued condemnations of Israel’s attack on Iran.
Israel’s retaliation suggests a growing confidence in the country’s ability to strike Iranian territory directly and effectively, potentially marking a new phase in the conflict, one in which Israel feels increasingly unconstrained by Iranian capabilities. Iran’s attempts to establish “new equations” of deterrence through direct strikes have largely backfired, potentially exposing openings that Israel seems increasingly willing to exploit. The cycle of testing red lines may continue and potentially intensify, absent significant external diplomatic intervention or a fundamental shift in either side’s strategic calculus.
