As the conflict in Lebanon has intensified, a large number of people, mostly from the Shiite community, have been forced out of their villages, towns, or neighborhoods. Some 1.2 million people have been displaced, according to the Lebanese government, while an estimated 200,000–300,000 have crossed the border into Syria.* This has created a complex situation at the community level, characterized by cooperation until now, but with unknown consequences in the future.
After Hezbollah opened a military front against Israel on October 8, 2023, preparations began in some areas to take care of the potential displaced. This was true of the mountain region of the Shouf where I live, whose dominant political figure is Druze leader Walid Joumblatt. Political parties on the ground established emergency committees, which reassured Hezbollah about the willingness locally to accommodate the displaced, even though ties between Joumblatt and the party have not always been good. In response, Hezbollah confirmed it had stocked relief supplies. This led nongovernmental organizations and political parties to slow their preparations, trusting in Hezbollah's capacity to manage relief efforts.
As the Israelis increased their airstrikes in the south, the Beqaa Valley, and Beirut’s southern suburbs in late September and into October, the ensuing wave of displacement overwhelmed initial relief plans. Problems arose as designated shelters offered limited logistical support and essentials such as food, medicine, and bedding. This shortage forced people to search for shelter elsewhere, leading to skyrocketing rents. Despite Hezbollah’s promises that it would provide aid and assistance, the party’s subsequent absence from the relief effort caused confusion among local nongovernmental organizations and parties. In the Shouf, for instance, while these local organizations provided help, their capabilities were limited due to uneven support from the political parties. The Future Movement was entirely absent, while organizations associated with Joumblatt’s Progressive Socialist Party, as well as the Jamaa al-Islamiyya, were more active.
The number of displaced then began rising, as did their needs, while funding became scarcer. However, the capacity of the Lebanese state to take over the relief effort was limited. The country has yet to recover from the financial collapse of 2019–2020, and the state is effectively bankrupt. At the same time, conflicts began over management of shelters between nongovernmental organizations and local branches of the political forces, with some people warning against receiving displaced persons associated with Hezbollah due to a history of conflict with the party, or fears that Israel could target Hezbollah members among the displaced. Despite such challenges, overall the local population welcomed the displaced.
Today, a comprehensive picture of the displacement process and its management has emerged. This I observed in my home village. Initially, many of the displaced, including those who later went to Syria, sought refuge with relatives or acquaintances, while a smaller percentage resorted to renting apartments. The poor, however, found no shelter other than refugee centers. In the initial phase, these centers suffered from a stark lack of services, whether bedding, food, water, hygienic supplies, or operating bathrooms. Over time, conditions improved as capable nongovernmental organizations became active, leading to relative stability in the provision of services to centers. Better cooperation and interaction with the displaced also improved the situation. For example, at a center in my area, one individual took it upon himself to fix the bathrooms due to his handyman skills. The displaced also played a crucial role in organizing their cooking and cleaning duties, which boosted morale, especially as good relationships developed between them and members of the nongovernmental organizations assisting them, as well as residents supervising the centers.
In contrast, problems intensified for those who sought shelter with relatives or rented apartments, as they had to depend on themselves or on their hosts. Many of them were reluctant to seek help from nongovernmental organizations and municipal authorities, leading to noticeable suffering. Most had left their homes without sufficient funds, and those with some money were anxious about the future, once their money would run out. A significant portion of the displaced relied on outside remittances.
Recently, the distribution of aid and services became better organized, and school directors receiving the displaced in their schools doubling as refugee centers took the lead in managing the facilities. At the same time, political parties and nongovernmental organizations found better means to communicate and distribute roles. This improved coordination, along with the fact that many of the displaced sought refuge with relatives or acquaintances, helped avoid the discord that host communities feared. The displaced expressed understanding and gratitude to the residents of host areas while maintaining their dignity.
In my area of the Shouf, the first phase of absorbing the shock of displacement concluded with notable community successes, and those providing aid began to shift their focus toward sustainability. Initially, rented or occupied apartments housed several families together, but now families were beginning to search for their own living spaces to avoid overcrowding. At the same time, the displaced began considering their expenses for the upcoming month and their uncertain future.
The displaced have not engaged in politics. Their focus remains on their situation and that of their families and relatives. However, the assassination of Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s secretary general and major figure for decades, had a significant impact. Despair spread among the displaced, who attempted to bolster their spirits by recalling the 2006 war and Hezbollah’s victory. Some affirmed that Hezbollah had never let them down and had always triumphed. Though some displaced repeated words from the Quran and by Nasrallah to the effect that there would be “no defeats from now on,” their mood reflected an understanding that their condition was much more challenging than ever before.
Noticeably, there was no discontent voiced about Hezbollah. On the contrary, attachment to the party appears to have increased due to its deep relationship with the Shiite community. The displaced feel that their fate is closely linked to Hezbollah’s, fearing for their own prospects should the party be defeated. They worry that losing their homes in the south, as well as their present status of being uprooted and humiliated, could take them back to the time before the advent of Imam Musa al-Sadr, who revived the community starting in the 1960s. In recent decades, the Shiite community has not known many institutions outside the framework of Hezbollah and the Amal Movement, where services have been provided either by Hezbollah’s institutions or by the Amal Movement’s networks within and outside the state.
As for the host communities, they are showing signs of economic fatigue but have responded to the displaced with warmth. In my mainly Sunni area, the population has tried to look beyond the abuses caused by Hezbollah—from its suspected involvement in the assassination of former prime minister Rafiq al-Hariri, to its takeover of Sunni areas of Beirut on May 7, 2008, to Hezbollah’s role in undermining the Lebanese state and thwarting the uprising in Syria. Although these memories remain, the current challenges, along with the existence of personal relationships and an understanding that Nasrallah’s assassination has affected the community profoundly, have led many people to regard welcoming the displaced as a duty. The conflict with Hezbollah has been postponed until later.
However, there are also very real limits to what can be done. Economically, all of Lebanon is ailing, so what is available to help the displaced is more restricted. One head of a nongovernmental organization reminded me that during the July 2006 war with Israel, “We went from house to house, and each house offered us something for the displaced. Today, the economic situation has changed, and despite sympathy, it cannot reach the levels of 2006, materially or emotionally.”
The displaced in my area expressed a desire to return to their places of residence as soon as the war ended, even if it meant living in a tent. This has reduced fears that they could settle indefinitely in areas to which they moved. Recently, the Israelis targeted an apartment housing the displaced in the town of Baadaran in the Shouf, which resulted in the death of eight people, three of whom were from the village. This raised fears that the Israelis might target other displaced individuals, prompting the locals to increase their scrutiny of new arrivals, amid suspicions that they might be Hezbollah members.
Other, more minor, incidents have increased frictions on the ground. The presence of the displaced has increased traffic congestion in host areas, as well as leading to greater consumption of scarce resources, such as water. There have also been complaints of the large amount of waste left by the displaced. All this indicates that while the displaced are welcomed today, their prolonged presence may become a source of antagonism with host communities.
On the political level, parties are almost absent from the relief process. Some are participating only in their social capacities and through their relations with international organizations to secure support. The state, in turn, has been absent on all fronts. Therefore, the ties between the displaced and their hosts have strengthened these communities against efforts to sow division, reducing sectarian tensions and political conflicts. However, there remains a need for continuous efforts to address the consequences of overcrowding, economic hardship, and an expansion of the war, which may well happen.
* The figure for the displaced was corrected, from 2.1 million to 1.2 million.
