Israel’s onslaught on Gaza, launched in response to Hamas’s Al-Aqsa Flood operation on October 7, together with Hezbollah’s subsequent opening of a limited military front with northern Israel in support of the Palestinians, has shaken up the Sunni political scene in Lebanon.
Perhaps the most apparent example of this is the decision by the Jamaa al-Islamiyya, a Sunni Islamist political party, to adopt a political line at odds with that of the Sunni establishment. Not only did the Jamaa, which has particularly close ties to Hamas, announce its participation in the newly activated southern front against Israel and take to firing rockets against Lebanon’s southern neighbor, but it also began speaking of reconciling two putatively contradictory political projects: Hezbollah’s resistance and the empowerment of the Lebanese state. This move may well further split the Sunni public between those who support the Jamaa’s aims and those who continue to oppose Hezbollah’s resistance strategy as detrimental to the Lebanese “state-building” endeavor.
Mainstream Sunni leaders and representatives, including the Future Movement, various politicians, and Dar al-Fatwa, the official body overseeing the religious affairs of Lebanon’s Sunnis, have opposed Hezbollah and its allies for two decades. This began following the assassination of Lebanon’s former prime minister Rafiq al-Hariri, for which many Sunnis accused the Syrian regime and Hezbollah. It deepened with the division of the country into March 8 and March 14 forces; the events of May 7, 2008, when Hezbollah briefly overran several Sunni quarters of Beirut; and Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria against a popular uprising that was supported by a majority of Lebanese Sunnis. That is why the Jamaa’s recent move toward aligning itself with Hezbollah constitutes a break with a cornerstone of contemporary Sunni political identity.
As a result of its new orientation, the Jamaa has had to contend with criticism from various quarters. Hezbollah’s opponents have viewed it as an outlier in the general Sunni arena and has sought to ensure that it does not significantly influence popular or official Sunni sentiment.
For example, Fouad Siniora, a former prime minister and right-hand man to the late Rafiq al-Hariri, has opposed involving Lebanon, particularly the Sunnis, in the ongoing Gaza conflict. Similarly, Radwan al-Sayyid, a respected religious figure, has called on the grand mufti, who is the head of Dar al-Fatwa, to intervene and restrain those clerics advocating for resistance. For these reasons, the Jamaa itself was initially wary of antagonizing sectors of the Sunni community. Indeed, when announcing its participation in the southern front against Israel, the Jamaa pointedly added that it was not coordinating with any group—in a clear allusion to Hezbollah.
Nevertheless, it soon became apparent that the Jamaa had drawn to its side a number of ordinary Sunnis, as well as certain senior figures in Dar al-Fatwa. Support for the Palestinian cause has long been a mainstay of both Arab nationalist and Islamist politics, two orientations historically popular among Lebanese Sunnis. To a certain extent, Hezbollah’s Sunni opponents in Lebanon were caught off guard, as evidenced by their awkward attempts to push back against the inroads the Hezbollah axis was making among Sunnis. Soon, the Jamaa felt confident enough to admit to battlefield coordination with Hezbollah—the very thing it had previously denied. Separately, media outlets reported a meeting between Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah and Jamaa Secretary General Sheikh Mohammed Taqqoush. The meeting indicated that the Jamaa’s fear of publicizing its ties with Hezbollah had receded considerably. The organization had moved from hesitation in mentioning field coordination with Hezbollah to announcing consultations between the two groups at the highest levels.
Matters quickly began to move beyond political stances and took on a religious dimension. On July 11, Taqqoush delivered a speech at an Ashura commemoration held by the Supreme Islamic Shiite Council, having earlier accepted an invitation to do so by the council’s vice president, Ali al-Khatib. This was noteworthy for three reasons. First, although Sunnis revere Hussein ibn Ali, they do not generally participate in events held to commemorate his death in battle.
Second, the Supreme Islamic Shiite Council’s close alignment with Hezbollah and Amal, the second main Shiite party in Lebanon, added a political element to his involvement. Third, Taqqoush faced security risks due to the Jamaa’s participation in military operations against Israel and the latter’s assassination of some of its senior members. His choice to attend and speak at such a public and prominent event highlighted the importance and bravery of his gesture.
One reason for the newfound boldness on the part of the Jamaa is that it had the support of key sheikhs from Dar al-Fatwa. At one point, Sheikh Ali Ghazzawi, the Dar al-Fatwa-appointed mufti of Zahleh and the Beqaa, appeared at the funeral of a member of the Fajr Forces, the Jamaa’s military wing, holding aloft a rifle and declaring his support for armed resistance against Israel. Following criticism of his actions by anti-Hezbollah Sunnis, Sheikh Amin al-Kurdi, the second highest authority in Dar al-Fatwa, defended Ghazzawi. Clearly alluding to the raised rifle scene, he said, “Bless your hands” and “You represent all sheikhs and all the honorable ones.” Additionally, video footage of the funerals of Fajr leaders killed in Israeli airstrikes suggests popular support for them.
It is reasonable to conclude that the Jamaa’s discourse and actions are consistent with the sentiments of many Sunnis, as well as the position of a major wing of Dar al-Fatwa. The Sunni sect sympathizes with Gaza and its resistance, and many of its members have also begun reconciling with the idea of coordinating with Hezbollah to serve the resistance. Yet this does not imply a Sunni-Shiite alliance. In Sunni quarters, supporting Hezbollah’s military engagement with Israel, whether for the sake of Palestine or still-occupied Lebanese land, may have to coexist uneasily with opposition to Hezbollah’s other policies, whether in Lebanon or Syria.
Ultimately, what the Jamaa recently expressed in the person of its (sole) member of parliament, Imad al-Hout, was instructive. In a nod to the traditional Sunni position, Hout stated that the group seeks a state founded on “citizenship” as well as “institutional regularity.” However, in a statement very much in line with Hezbollah’s position, he also said that the Jamaa is intent on “confronting the Zionist enemy, ideally through a state defensive strategy.” Hout is basically arguing for a project that integrates state-building with resistance. This approach situates the Jamaa, and even the Sunni sect as a whole, as a bridge between the two otherwise opposing trends.
Yet striking a balance between resistance and state-building is exceedingly difficult. On the one hand, Christian forces and Sunni traditional politicians in Lebanon are urging the Gulf states and Egypt to steer the Sunnis away from conflict with Israel and the influence of Hezbollah and similarly minded Sunni parties. On the other hand, Hezbollah is expending considerable effort in turning its otherwise temporary coordination with the Jamaa into a long-term alliance, one that will draw in additional Sunni groups. As a result, the immediate future for Sunnis in Lebanon is sensitive and unpredictable, with the distinct possibility of stark divisions.
Indeed, although both the Jamaa and its opponents are working to strengthen the Sunnis’ position within the internal Lebanese political landscape and enhance their own status, the ongoing conflict with Israel and its potential escalation pose risks to all involved. The Jamaa and its allies might struggle to implement their vision and secure the necessary resources, which could weaken their influence and that of their supporters. Should the Jamaa fail to secure the needed resources, it might seek protection and support from Hezbollah. Conversely, opponents of the Jamaa who resist the growth of pro-resistance public opinion among Sunnis will become estranged from their base, further diminishing their representative role within the sect. Such dynamics could result in increased marginalization of the Sunnis and deepen frustration in the community.
Either way, preventing a major split among Sunnis, and possibly a situation in which part of the sect feels that it has been shunted aside, will require serious efforts by all concerned.
