The United States’ involvement in Lebanon has often followed a predictable pattern, writes a former U.S. ambassador to the country, David Hale, in a recent book titled American Diplomacy Toward Lebanon: Lessons in Foreign Policy and the Middle East. The U.S. approach has oscillated between inflated expectations that have crashed against harsh realities, leading to periods of withdrawal.
In his book, Hale, currently a global fellow with the Wilson Center in Washington, D.C, examines the history of U.S. diplomacy in Lebanon from the 19th century to the present day. Drawing on his distinguished career at the State Department, including roles as undersecretary of state for political affairs and ambassadorships (aside from Beirut) in Pakistan and Jordan, Hale provides invaluable perspectives on the complexities of U.S. engagement with Lebanon. As the Middle East regains prominence on the global stage, Hale’s book also presents historical insights into the dynamics that have shaped and are still shaping the region, making it essential reading for scholars, policymakers, and a Lebanese population that has had a longstanding penchant for dissecting Washington’s regional behavior.
Hale examines six pivotal episodes in U.S. engagement with Lebanon. Each chapter focuses on a specific historical event, beginning with Lebanon’s independence and progressing through the military intervention in 1958 under president Dwight Eisenhower, U.S. diplomatic efforts to avert an escalation of the Lebanese conflict in 1976, president Ronald Reagan’s military intervention in 1982–1984, president Bill Clinton’s “Syria First” policy during the 1990s, and president George W. Bush’s support for the “freedom agenda” during the first decade of this century.
Each of these episodes, constituting individual chapters, highlights the workings of global and regional dynamics in Lebanon and U.S. foreign policy objectives. Throughout the book, a few recurring themes emerge: the fluctuation in the degree of U.S. involvement in Lebanon; the challenges posed by both U.S. allies and adversaries; and the contrasting perspectives toward governance and conflict resolution of American policymakers and Middle Eastern actors. Hale’s analysis attempts to understand the cyclical nature of American engagement in Lebanon, characterized by periods of intense involvement followed by neglect, and the enduring challenges of navigating relationships with friends and foes of the United States in the region.
Hale’s expertise in this field is grounded in a distinguished diplomatic career spanning over three decades. He joined the Foreign Service in 1985, served in key diplomatic posts across the region, including Tunisia, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia. His tenure was equally outstanding in Washington, where he held roles such as deputy assistant secretary of state for Israel, Egypt, and the Levant (2008–2009) and director for Israel-Palestinian affairs (2001–2003), as well as serving as executive assistant to secretary of state Madeleine Albright during the Clinton years.
Noteworthy among his experiences was his extensive service in the Beirut embassy, spanning nearly 25 years in total. He began his tenure as the embassy’s sole political officer in 1992, and later was deputy chief of mission during ambassador David Satterfield’s term from 1998 to 2001, before serving as ambassador in 2013–2015. Throughout, Hale’s contributions significantly influenced U.S.-Lebanon relations.
U.S. officials generally perceive Lebanon as a bundle of complex issues—troublesome but not vital to Washington’s interests. American involvement in the country has been sporadic, driven more by broader concerns than a genuine focus on Lebanon itself. This was evident in 1957 and 1958 when the United States first backed president Camille Chamoun, leading to the victory of his parliamentary bloc in the elections of 1957, and then deployed 14,000 troops in 1958 after the revolution in Iraq, for the purpose of countering a perceived Soviet-backed Arab nationalist threat in the region. This marked the first implementation of the Eisenhower Doctrine, in which the United States declared its readiness to intervene in safeguarding regimes it deemed to be under threat from global communism. The intervention also cemented a lasting image of U.S. interference in Lebanese politics. Ultimately, however, the Americans played a role in convincing the opposing camps to end their conflict by reaching a compromise in which the commander of the Lebanese army, Fouad Chehab, was elected president. Such compromises would go on to characterize Lebanese politics for the next 50 years.
The assessment that the United States continues to meddle in Lebanese affairs influences how Lebanese politicians engage with American officials today. Hale observes that Lebanese officials display a keen interest in the U.S. stance on current events in their country, some even seeking guidance from American officials on potential actions in order to gauge their standing with Washington. This contrasts with Hale’s experiences in other countries, where officials were more focused on advising the Americans on their policies. Consequently, Hale believes that American diplomats in Lebanon must acknowledge that the United States cannot detach itself from Lebanon’s domestic dynamics. This realization leads him to emphasize the great impact, whether through action or inaction, that the United States has had on Lebanon, in which he underscores the need for careful consideration of both approaches.
Indeed, Hale points to the recent past, after the end of his assignment in Beirut in 2015, during another moment when Lebanon was in a political impasse. He recalls that U.S. diplomats undertook “an active and indiscreet campaign” to support Suleiman Franjieh’s bid for the presidency. The move ultimately helped no one except the then head of the Free Patriotic Movement, Michel Aoun, who was elected president instead.
Hale’s book does not advocate for increased U.S. intervention in Lebanese affairs. Instead, it calls for and tries to produce a deeper understanding of Lebanon and aims to address the contradictions in the U.S. policy approach to the country. Hale sees consistent engagement with a clear communication of U.S. policy goals toward Lebanon and the broader region as a starting point for better foreign policy. In contrast, instances of U.S. inaction, such as the Reagan administration’s lack of a response to the 1983 Marine barracks bombing in Beirut, have only empowered Washington’s adversaries.
Hale also acknowledges the challenge of maintaining consistent policies amid the United States’ electoral cycles, the results of which can lead to abrupt shifts overseas. These shifts allow undemocratic adversaries of the United States, and even some allies, to always have the option of waiting out administrations they oppose. To move forward toward a more stable Middle East, and therefore a more stable Lebanon, long-term planning, consistent policies, and clear communication of policies that address root causes in the region are necessary, Hale believes.
Hale’s book presents a persuasive narrative of U.S. engagement in Lebanon. As the Middle East evolves, his insights offer valuable lessons and an insider’s perspective on the mindset of U.S. diplomats when it comes to Lebanon. This is important for Lebanese officials seeking to understand, engage with, and shape American policy toward their country in the future.
