Sergei Melkonian is a research fellow at the Applied Policy Research Institute of Armenia and at the Institute of Oriental Studies in Moscow. He earned his Ph.D. on the subject of Israel-Syria relations from the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation in 2021. He teaches and heads the Middle East and North Africa program at the Armenian Research and Development Institute in Yerevan. Diwan interviewed Melkonian in mid-May to get his perspective on the situation in the South Caucasus and the relations there among Türkiye, Israel, and Iran, and on Russia’s position in the Middle East in light of the ongoing war in Ukraine.
Armenak Tokmajyan: You have argued that the South Caucasus, especially Armenia, can be considered a part of the Middle East. Please elaborate on this.
Sergei Melkonian: There are different approaches to answering this question. We can start with the most obvious one: geography. The ethnogenesis and statehood of the Armenians was formed in the Armenian highlands. It is part of Western Asia, a geographical region that includes the Middle East as a political region. To understand that this geographical space is part of the Middle East, it is enough to note that the two rivers around which the civilizations of the region were formed, the Tigris and the Euphrates, flow out of the Armenian highlands. Today, Armenia borders Türkiye and Iran, two key actors in the Middle East, while Erbil, Tehran, and Baghdad are closer to Yerevan than Moscow or Brussels.
In a historical sense, Armenia’s borders went deep into the Middle East, which was its natural environment. Later, Armenia was part of both the Ottoman Empire and the Safavid and Qajar Empires in Persia, which covered the entire region. To find Armenia on a world map in any historical period, we must refer to the cartographers who illustrated and described the borders of the modern Middle East.
Armenia is also part of the region culturally. Considering the area where Armenians have lived throughout history, one can find parallels with the Arab East in terms of traditions, cuisine, linguistic borrowings, and so on. For example, the Armenians were part of Syrian society several centuries before the emergence of the Armenia Diaspora that resulted from the genocide during World War I. And the Armenian Apostolic Church is one of the oldest Eastern Christian churches.
On the political level, Armenian states have been part of Middle Eastern regional processes throughout history. Today the situation has not changed. Armenia feels the consequences of conflicts in the region. This includes the resettlement of Armenian refugees from Iraq and Syria, or the participation of mercenaries from Libya and Syria on Azerbaijan’s side in its 2020 war with Armenia.
AT: We have observed growing cooperation between Israel and Azerbaijan in the South Caucasus. What are Israel’s primary objectives in this regard, and how does Russia perceive Israel’s expanding role in its “backyard”?
SM: In the past, relations between Israel and Azerbaijan primarily took place in the economic and energy spheres, while today much attention is paid to military-technical cooperation and security issues. Therefore, Azerbaijan has taken on an important role in Israel’s foreign policy strategy, which is often referred to as the “new peripheral strategy.” This is based on forming close relationships with states in close proximity to the main source of threat to Israel’s security. Therefore, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, which have a land and sea border with Iran, as well as the Gulf countries, are priority areas for Israeli diplomacy.
After Azerbaijan established control over a part of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020, the border between Iran and Azerbaijan increased by around 100 kilometers, and Israel gained the possibility of having access to monitoring facilities only 7 kilometers from Iran. Today, unofficially, Israel supports the opening of the “Zangezur corridor,” a project of Türkiye and Azerbaijan to create a corridor between both countries through Armenian sovereign territory. Implementation of this project will lead, through Azerbaijan, to a significant increase in Türkiye’s influence in areas just north of the Iran border.
As for Russia, it does not pay much attention to Israeli activity in the South Caucasus. First, the desire to alter the status quo in Nagorno-Karabakh through the 2020 war came from Azerbaijan. Israel was one of the beneficiaries, as it played a very important role in both preparing Azerbaijan and providing support during the conflict. Second, Moscow does not see Israel as a channel for Western influence in the South Caucasus. Third, Israel does not affect Russian interests in the region; Moscow’s key opponent in the South Caucasus is Ankara.
AT: Can you describe the interplay between Israel’s and Türkiye’s interests in the South Caucasus, and what you see as the ultimate outcome of this situation?
SM: Türkiye and Israel have different interests in the region. For Ankara, it has historically been a place in which it has pursued its national interests. To this day Türkiye seeks to spread its influence using economic, energy, logistical, and military tools. Therefore, it is a competitor of Russia and Iran in the struggle over spheres of influence. For Israel, the South Caucasus has no such strategic importance. It is significant in the context of energy imports, the arms market, and, especially, creating an area of tension with Iran.
The main intersection point of Türkiye’s and Israel’s interests in the South Caucasus is the weakening of Iran. Despite the political crisis between Türkiye and Israel, both supported Azerbaijan in the war against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020. Both also benefited from the war. Türkiye increased its influence over Azerbaijan, built up a military presence there, and made it more possible that it would be able to open the “Zangezur corridor.” Israel, in turn, gained access to the Iranian border and to a strong ally on that border, which it can use to put pressure on Tehran. Competition between Türkiye and Israel may arise in the military-technical sphere—who will supply more weapons to Azerbaijan? Otherwise, cooperation is more suited to the interests of both than competition or rivalry.
AT: Russia recently published its new concept of foreign policy, which was developed after the beginning of the war in Ukraine. Where does the Middle East, especially Syria, fit into this new vision?
SM: The new foreign policy concept refers to the Middle East in different contexts. First, Russia expresses support for regional formats of integration and dialogue between states. For Moscow, this means that all regional issues should be discussed exclusively by Middle Eastern states, meaning the exclusion of nonregional actors from the processes, primarily the West. Second, the Middle East is the only region that is mentioned in the context of the fight against international terrorism. Moreover, the document specifically emphasizes Russia’s readiness to cooperate with states in the region to protect Christian populations. Third, the Middle East is mentioned in the context of Russia’s fifth most important regional priority, namely dealings with the broader Islamic world, due to its potential to become one of the centers of a multipolar world. It is important to add that Russia views the region as one of the places that adheres to traditional conservative values, which also does not accept the Western neoliberal model.
As for Syria, the previous 2016 version of the concept included an entire paragraph describing Russia’s approach to resolving the conflict there and its vision for the future of the country. The concept was approved a year after the start of Russia’s military campaign in Syria in September 2015, and described Russia’s policy and goals. The new version of the concept does not contain this paragraph, but indicates the importance of normalizing Syria’s relations with its neighbors. This shows that, from Russia’s point of view, the conflict has mostly been resolved. The rest depends on the normalization of Syria’s relations with the states of the Middle East. In fact, Syria ranks second after Iran on Moscow’s list of priorities.
AT: While Middle Eastern countries have maintained relations with Russia, despite the conflict in Ukraine, what medium- to long-term impacts do you anticipate in Moscow’s ties with the region if Russia’s campaign there continues to falter?
SM: Strategically, it is important for Russia to demonstrate that the emerging international order is not Western-centric. In this context, special attention is paid to the Middle East. Russia offers many formats of cooperation that do not directly depend on the development of the Ukraine campaign: the creation of a free-trade zone with the Eurasian Economic Union, the development of communications in Eurasia, the construction of nuclear power plants, and so on. The success of Russian initiatives depends on several prerequisites.
First, Russia’s financial and economic capabilities. Obviously, Russia cannot be a driver of such initiatives if the campaign in Ukraine falters. For example, today Moscow is capable of investing in the Resht-Astara section to complete the creation of the North-South corridor, a transport network destined to carry freight through Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran, parts of central Asia, and India. But if the situation in Ukraine worsens, this may no longer be true.
Second, setbacks in Ukraine may undermine the willingness of the states in the region to cooperate with a weak Russia, which would only strengthen the West. Part of the Middle Eastern population perceives Russia and its president, Vladimir Putin, as strong for challenging the dominant West. However, in case of weakness, the level of support and willingness to develop strategic projects with Russia will decrease, especially is there is pressure or more favorable offers from the West.
And third, in case of more setbacks in Ukraine, expect a decline in the Russian military presence in Syria. At the same time, Moscow will seek to retain a position in the country, one that ensures it can return later on, and even enlarge its presence.
