Amr Hamzawy | Director of the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
China’s growing role in the Middle East and North Africa has now received its political baptism—the restoration of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran brokered in Beijing by Chinese diplomats. Most regional powers, which without exception enjoy strong economic and trade ties with China, welcome greater Chinese involvement in efforts to peacefully resolve conflicts and develop permanent security arrangements. This is particularly true after more than a decade of extended civil, proxy, and border wars, alongside American and European failures to end them. The Chinese-brokered Saudi-Iranian agreement is the first time a major power other than the United States has been unilaterally involved in reshuffling security arrangements and containing conflicts in the Middle East since the end of the Cold War in 1990.
The regional rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran has shaped most conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa since 2011. This rivalry led Yemen to a total humanitarian disaster after war broke out between pro-Iranian Houthi militias and tribes supportive of the internationally recognized Yemeni government in 2015.* It has also resulted in chronic instability in Iraq, a protracted crisis in Lebanon, and, among other factors, the absence of a negotiated political settlement in Syria. Beyond these conflict-torn countries, the Saudi-Iranian rivalry has threatened the fragile stability of the Gulf subregion and brought home the limits of U.S.-backed security guarantees to Arab allies when the Houthis launched drone and missile attacks on oil refineries and other strategic targets in Saudi Arabia in 2019 and attacked the United Arab Emirates.
If implemented in good faith, the Chinese-brokered deal may result in quick gains and long-term strategic benefits for the Middle East and North Africa. Turning the current truce in Yemen into a permanent peaceful settlement represents the most immediate potential gain. Among the possible long-term benefits are the facilitation of gradual political openings in Iraq and Lebanon, greenlighting the return of Syria to the Arab League, and enabling Iran and Arab Gulf countries to constructively discuss security arrangements.
On all these fronts, Chinese mediation and the resulting agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran mark a new stage in the rivalry among major powers. This will lead to the development of new security arrangements, potentially reshaping regional cooperation and conflicts.
Aaron David Miller | Senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, focusing on U.S. foreign policy
In a quip that would prove prescient, former Saudi foreign minister Saud al-Faisal once noted that Saudi Arabia didn’t have a Catholic marriage with the United States, but a Muslim one in which more than one wife was permitted. Saudi Arabia doesn’t want a divorce with Washington, it’s just seeking marriage with other countries. Nowhere have Saud al-Faisal’s remarks been more stunningly demonstrated than in China’s recent success in brokering a deal to reconcile Iran and Saudi Arabia. Given the decades of hostility between Tehran and Riyadh, the deal may prove much less than meets the eye—a transactional rather than a transformational change in their relations. But it carries three implications for U.S. foreign policy.
First, the decision by successive administrations to downgrade the region, or at best to reprioritize it in favor of the Indo-Pacific, has opened up new opportunities for China and Russia. The United States may well remain the Gulf states’ most important and preferred security partner, but we’re in an increasingly multipolar world when it comes to political and economic matters. For the Saudis to deal with China as they are doing today isn’t simply a tactic to gain leverage with Washington, but a strategic decision.
Second, the United States now faces a China that’s playing a weak Middle East hand deftly. Ironically, while the U.S. Navy secures the sea lanes in the Gulf, which protects exports of hydrocarbons to China (40 percent of the oil it consumes comes from the Middle Eastern region), Beijing is developing closer ties with the Gulf states in what may prove to be an increasingly zero-sum game of competition with the United States.
Third, the Saudi-Iranian accord may well reduce tensions in Yemen, which would be a plus for U.S. policy. At the same time, it will likely undercut U.S. efforts to isolate Iran in the region. The notion that Saudi Arabia would allow itself to become the tip of an Israeli or U.S. spear to deter Iran was always somewhat unrealistic. And now you have a presumptive U.S. “ally” that carries great weight in the region and the Islamic world legitimizing an Iran that is repressing its own people and aiding Russia in its brutal war against Ukraine. On balance, the deal cannot be a happy outcome for Washington policymakers
Paul Haenle | Holds the Maurice R. Greenberg Director’s Chair at Carnegie China; visiting senior research fellow at the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore
China will likely present its role in helping to mediate the restoration of Saudi-Iranian diplomatic relations as an example of the effectiveness of its new Global Security Initiative. Beijing is seeking to present itself as a contributor to global stability, a way of deflecting criticism that China freerides on the stability provided by the international system as well as mitigating the pushback it has received for its ambiguous position on the war in Ukraine.
China will also seek to contrast its diplomatic approach to tensions in the Middle East with what it describes as the United States’ aggressive, militarized approach. The Middle East is an important part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Beijing could leverage its role in easing Saudi-Iranian ties by shoring up energy and trade ties throughout the region. If China can build on this momentum by convincing Iran to freeze its nuclear program, or by playing a role in a larger Middle East peace process, Beijing’s rising regional influence will be welcomed by many in the international community. If, however, China seeks to leverage its newfound interest in conflict mediation for the sole benefit of its international image, China’s role as a genuine contributor to global stability may be short-lived.
Karim Sadjadpour | Senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he focuses on Iran and U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East
The Chinese-brokered Saudi-Iranian normalization agreement is perhaps the first major diplomatic example of a post-America Middle East. As one Arab cabinet minister told me, “The BIG story is not what Saudi and Iran did today, it’s how China has so much influence and leverage in the region.”
China, the world’s largest importer of energy, needs stability in the Middle East to ensure the free flow of energy from the region. Deescalation between two regional powers and major energy producers is critical to those objectives. What’s not yet clear is the extent to which Beijing will involve itself in the details and enforcement of the agreement. If either party violates the terms, how will China respond?
Iran is deeply isolated, humiliated by months of anti-government protests, and heavily reliant on China both strategically and economically. This deal lessens the Islamic Republic’s isolation, earns legitimacy for the regime, and strengthens China’s regional influence at the expense of the United States. Yet it remains unclear whether the Islamic Republic is prepared to meaningfully change its longtime regional policies.
For Saudi Arabia, Iran’s 2019 attack on Saudi Arabia’s national oil company, Aramco, taught Riyadh that it could no longer count on the United States to protect the kingdom from Iran. Given Beijing’s enormous leverage over Tehran and its economic interest in Middle Eastern stability, Saudi Arabia likely hopes the deal provides it with a Chinese shield against Iranian aggression. That remains to be seen.
Saudi Arabia views Iran’s role in Yemen as an existential threat, while Islamic Republic officials view the Saudi-supported, Persian-language TV channel Iran International—one of Iran’s top news channels—to be a major source of internal subversion. It’s unclear to what extent the deal will impact either of these issues.
At best, this agreement will result in a very cold peace. The 1993 Oslo Accords and the 2015 Iran nuclear deal have taught us to be cautious about the impact and durability of peace agreements between two adversaries—in this case Saudi Arabia and Iran—that have no trust in one another.
Abdullah Baabood | Nonresident scholar at the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut
After decades of sometimes violent competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran for leadership in the Middle East, the Chinese-negotiated agreement to restore relations between the two countries signaled, at least a temporary, a reordering of the region’s usual alliances and rivalries. It also represented one of the most striking shifts in Middle Eastern diplomacy during recent years.
While it remains uncertain how far the rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran will actually go, the decision to reopen their embassies within two months, after a seven-year rupture, represents a positive first step. The announcement stirred cautious optimism for reinvigorating the ongoing processes of deescalation in various regional conflicts and reducing regional tensions in the Arabian Peninsula and the wider Gulf region. It will likely lessen the fear of Iranian intervention in the region and support for Shia groups and militias. It will also help other Gulf countries that already have diplomatic relations with Iran to enhance their relationship with Tehran, without having to watch over their shoulders, while encouraging reluctant states to also establish ties with Iran.
The agreement could potentially build mutual confidence, make less likely a regional arms race, and allow all the countries of the Gulf to focus on their internal challenges and economic development. The agreements might also help to ease the troubled nuclear talks, perhaps even secure an agreement. It will also push forward the ongoing Saudi-Houthi negotiations over a lasting ceasefire in Yemen to arrive at a peaceful solution to the conflict. This, in turn, could allow humanitarian assistance to and reconstruction of the war-torn country. The agreements could also help to resolve other lingering problems in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, but its impact on extending the Abraham Accords to Saudi Arabia remains unclear.
Yasmine Farouk | Nonresident scholar in the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
The reestablishment of diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia is a welcome development. But even if it is implemented, it will not resolve all the differences between the two countries or their rivalry, let alone preempt efforts by regional players to spoil things. There are four key factors that help to explain why Riyadh accepted to take a public step forward with Iran after two years of difficult diplomatic bargaining behind closed doors.
The first was Chinese mediation. China’s leverage over Iran, its interest in having good relations with Riyadh, and its understanding of Saudi concerns encouraged the Saudis to give the agreement the benefit of the doubt. By responding positively to a Chinese initiative, Saudi Arabia also allowed China to score a point in its competition over influence with the United States. It also comes at a time when cheap Russian oil is threatening Saudi Arabia’s market share in China and when the United States is no longer the security guarantor it used to be.
Second, Saudi Arabia has fully embraced a detached pragmatist foreign policy that allows it to make U-turns on policies that have proven to be unproductive. Finding an arrangement with Iran was perfectly compatible with this attitude.
Third, Iran was in a weak position compared to Saudi Arabia, which is gaining growing recognition for its claim to an international role. Yet Iran has a record of lashing out at its neighbors when it is cornered, especially since Saudi Arabia invested in Iran’s instability through private support for anti-regime mobilization.
Fourth, Saudi Arabia has much to gain from a regional deescalation of tensions and ending the war in Yemen in terms of advancing and securing the achievements of its Vision 2030 plan. But it is not all good news for the kingdom, yet. The trilateral statement issued on March 10 didn’t mention an Iranian gesture on Yemen and it wasn’t clear about the extent of China’s role in the rest of the reconciliation process. Saudi Arabia also needs to manage its deescalation of tensions with Iran and its Western partners’ escalation of tensions with Iran. Those elements partly explained why Saudi officials expressed guarded optimism toward the new deal.
Mohanad Hage Ali | Director of communications and senior fellow at the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut
The Saudi-Iranian deal could potentially help facilitate a discussion to end the stalemate in Lebanon’s presidential election. Regional deals or understandings like this one often disentangle the knots of the country’s dysfunctional politics, alongside providing financial incentives. This occurred in 2009, following the Saudi-Syrian rapprochement, although the Syrian uprising quickly rolled back that deal’s political implications.
However, there are three reasons why a resolution in Lebanon might take longer than expected this time. First, Saudi Arabia is part of a five-country coordination group over the Lebanon crisis, which includes the United States and France, and any new policy would have to be coordinated within this framework. This would apply to coupling any economic incentives with painful reforms that the Lebanese political class has avoided implementing since 2019.
Second, following many years of tensions and proxy conflicts, Iran and Saudi Arabia require trust-building measures and a gradual deescalation process. Reaching a deal in Lebanon might be dependent on Yemen, a more important priority for Saudi Arabia, given both the conflict and proximity to the kingdom. And coupling a resolution of Lebanon’s crisis with the one in Yemen could potentially delay a much-needed breakthrough on the presidential election.
Finally, the country’s internal polarization and hung parliament demand a more inclusive agreement on a presidential candidate, this candidate’s program, and a new government. None of Hezbollah’s political foes have engaged with the party yet in a meaningful process to reach such a conclusion, nor has Hezbollah done so. The Saudi-Iranian agreement would certainly facilitate such a process, but unlike 2009 Riyadh’s leverage in Lebanon is shared today, and any agreement with Tehran might not easily manifest itself in politics.
Harith Hasan | Nonresident fellow at the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut
Iraq is the country were the dialogue between Saudi Arabia and Iran began, mediated by former prime minister Mustapha al-Kadhimi. For obvious reasons, it is potentially one of the main beneficiaries of the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement. First, it has the unique position of having land borders with Saudi Arabia and Iran. Second, the two countries embraced competing agendas in Iraq, and their long rivalry contributed to its destabilization.
More importantly, while Yemen is likely to be the place where this rapprochement will face its immediate test, Iraq is going to be a crucial testing ground in the long run. Iran has built up considerable influence in Iraq that recently came to affect not only Saudi interests, but Saudi security as well. The 2019 drone attack on Saudi oil facilities and the 2021 attack on the royal palace in Riyadh are believed to have been initiated in Iraq. The network of militias and armed groups that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has formed, trained, and equipped in Iraq have been building a strong presence near the Iraqi-Saudi border, with the declared objective of “Taking the battle to the Al Saud’s lands,” as stated by a leader of the Iraqi Kataib Hezbollah militia.
Therefore, we have to see whether the IRGC is going to moderate the behavior of its allied armed groups regarding Saudi Arabia, and even to seek their redeployment outside the Iraqi-Saudi border zone—a Saudi demand that was communicated to the Iraqi government. Yet this will also be a test for the Iraqi government, over which Tehran’s friends have considerable influence. The government can benefit from the rapprochement by balancing its foreign ties and securing a wider space for autonomous policy.
Kheder Khaddour | Nonresident scholar at the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut, focusing on Syria
In Syria’s case, the Saudi-Iranian reconciliation will create an opportunity for the Assad regime to put its internal house in order, as well as to weave new regional relationships. The war in Syria played a major role in isolating the regime from the rest of the Arab region. This pushed Damascus closer to Tehran, and deepened their relationship to the extent that there is no going back. It is an alliance built on blood, as Iranians have fought alongside Syrian regime forces for over a decade. The Saudi-Iranian deal will not come at the expense of Tehran’s main ally in Syria, the Assad regime. On the contrary, it will provide the regime with space to operate on a regional level through new connections with a range of Arab countries.
Any new links the Assad regime is able to build in the coming years will be the fruit of this deal. Saudi Arabia is the immovable barrier facing the regime’s return to the regional Arab framework. If one of the main reasons pushing Saudi Arabia to cut off its relations with Damascus was Syria’s alliance with Iran, that reason is now gone, and the regime’s reentry into the Arab order is a matter of time. But even this major regional breakthrough will not resolve Syria’s dilemma. Major issues resulting from the war will remain, including reconstruction, security, and demographics—meaning the return of Syrian refugees and internally displaced populations.
* The sentence was changed to correct an inaccuracy in the date.
