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Thirty years ago, the idea that China could challenge the United States economically, globally, and militarily seemed unfathomable. Yet today, China is considered another great power in the international system. How did China manage to build power, from a weaker resource position, in an international system that was dominated by the U.S.? What factors determined the strategies Beijing pursued to achieve this feat? The “upstart approach,” determined by where and how China chose to compete, allowed China to rise economically, politically, and militarily, without triggering a catastrophic international backlash that would stem its rise.
Carnegie India hosted Oriana Skylar Mastro, for a discussion on her book, “Upstart: How China Became a Great Power” at the Security Studies Seminar. Beyond explaining the unique nature of China’s rise, Mastro’s book provides policy guidance on how the U.S. can maintain a competitive edge in this new era of great power competition. The discussion was moderated by Srinath Raghavan.
DISCUSSION HIGHLIGHTS
The Upstart Strategy: The author comprehensively traces China’s exponential rise over the past thirty years and addresses the critical question of how it managed to occupy a seat at the highchair of global politics. Upstart distinguishes itself from existing analyses of China’s ascent by offering a framework that emphasizes its agency within the spheres of influence. This “upstart strategy” of China is a combination of three factors: emulation, exploitation and entrepreneurship. Emulation is the use of old strategy in traditional areas of competition, by mainly imitating initiatives and tactics of the other superpower; i.e., the United States. Exploitation, on the other hand, is the practice of old tricks in new arenas of competition, for instance, where the United States is lacking or where there exist strategic gaps. Meanwhile, entrepreneurship is the execution of unique and innovative strategies in upcoming areas of competition. Five factors interact to create incentives for either of the three Es—strategic effectiveness, efficacy, domestic political factors, United States potential policy response, and the existence of gaps.
Foreign Policy: Participants discussed a mix of these three E strategies in the foreign policy domain. China has undoubtedly borrowed some tools from the United States’ foreign policy such as undertaking an active role in international institutions, leveraging soft power, or assuming the role of a diplomatic mediator, for instance, its success in thawing the relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia was notable. To China’s credit, it has exploited various gaps left by the United States in its dealing with the international community. For instance, while the United States dominates arms sales, China has managed to create new markets for itself. Additionally, Beijing’s expansive diplomatic footprints have stretched far and wide, extensively reaching out to the areas that Washington has for long seen to be strategically unimportant including Africa, Central Asia, and South Asia. However, many of its strategies have been its own such as observing regime neutrality and becoming the internal security partner of choice along with forging unique strategic partnerships.
Economic Policy: Participants discussed the upstart strategy’s execution in China’s economic policy on two fronts, one, its Free Trade Agreements (FTAS) and two, the internationalization of its currency. First, China maintains FTAs with seventeen countries while negotiating with eight more following the United States’ FTA patterns. The upstart strategy categorizes China’s preferential trade agreements with developing countries in Asia and the Pacific under the exploitation framework. In comparison, the United States was slow to engineer regional bilateral trade agreements resulting in intense trade competition. Second, the internationalization of the Renminbi is an example of the emulation strategy. China engaged in bilateral currency swap agreements that have gradually built a foundation for the Renminbi to be used as a hedging instrument for countries such as Argentina or Egypt with default histories. China further distinguishes itself by doubling down on its digital currency, i.e., e-yuan, e-CNY, digital renminbi, or digital RMB, creating pathways for the future of finance not just for its internal monetary system but for the global economy. Entrepreneurial efforts led by China in the introduction of digital currency accords it the first-mover advantage which is supported by countries that they have friendly relations with, especially those in its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
Military Strategy and Nuclear Policy: The participants noted that in the military and nuclear arena, China’s entrepreneurial instincts have dominated. China has undeniable goals for military domination in Asia, however, participants mused that this does not necessarily imply world domination. Moreover, Chinese overseas interests are represented as “strategic strongpoints,” such as participation in the BRI, that have allowed it to build non-offensive military bases. Beijing claims that these are fundamentally different from those maintained by other states as they do not conduct offensive operations, rather, provide public security goods. Yet another entrepreneurial effort made by China is its nuclear policy. Participants dissected the argument that China is mirroring the United States’ nuclear policy. However, the only similarities are the ‘minimum deterrence with assured retaliation” strategy and the no-first-use pledge. Participants recognised the “delayed modernisation’ that the Chinese military went through, wherein it first modernised the bureaucratic structure and then increased numbers for missile defence. For instance, in the past twenty-five years, China increased its nuclear arsenal from 234 to 320 while the United States currently has a total of 5,800 warheads. Participants acknowledged that this nuclear buildup, or rather, the current nuclear policy is part of the decades old agenda that started in the 1980s–90s to build their national military capabilities.
This summary was prepared by Anavi Akhaury and Swasti Sachdeva, interns with the Security Studies program at Carnegie India.
