conference

2025 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference

April 21, 2025 - April 22, 2025
Westin Washington DC, Downtown, 999 9th Street NW, Washington, DC
register to attend

Please note that this year’s venue will be Westin Washington DC, Downtown, 999 9th Street NW, Washington, DC.

For over 30 years, experts, officials, executives, journalists, and students from across the globe have come together to debate—and explore solutions for—the most pressing challenges in nuclear nonproliferation, arms control, disarmament, deterrence, energy, and security at the Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference.

The Nuclear Policy Program seeks to keep the cost of participating in the Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference as low as possible. With regret, we cannot offer free or discounted registration. The direct costs of hosting the event (which exclude staff time) significantly exceed revenue from registration and exhibitor fees and grants; indeed, the conference is possible only because of Carnegie’s institutional support. 

Category 2025 Early Bird 2025 Registration
Retiree/Student $290 $320
NGO/Academic $515 $565
Corporate $1,400 $1,540
Government $615 $675
Digital Participant $0 $0

Carnegie is able to offer refunds until April 1, 2025. The full ticket price, minus administrative fees, will be returned to the original payment method. After April 1, we can offer refunds only for those who are unable to attend due to illness and provide supporting documentation. To request a refund or if you are unable to pay by card, please reach out to Carnegie_Nuclear_Policy_Conference@ceip.org.

Please note that this year’s venue will be Westin Washington DC, Downtown, 999 9th Street NW, Washington, DC.

For over 30 years, experts, officials, executives, journalists, and students from across the globe have come together to debate—and explore solutions for—the most pressing challenges in nuclear nonproliferation, arms control, disarmament, deterrence, energy, and security at the Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference.

The Nuclear Policy Program seeks to keep the cost of participating in the Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference as low as possible. With regret, we cannot offer free or discounted registration. The direct costs of hosting the event (which exclude staff time) significantly exceed revenue from registration and exhibitor fees and grants; indeed, the conference is possible only because of Carnegie’s institutional support. 

Category 2025 Early Bird 2025 Registration
Retiree/Student $290 $320
NGO/Academic $515 $565
Corporate $1,400 $1,540
Government $615 $675
Digital Participant $0 $0

Carnegie is able to offer refunds until April 1, 2025. The full ticket price, minus administrative fees, will be returned to the original payment method. After April 1, we can offer refunds only for those who are unable to attend due to illness and provide supporting documentation. To request a refund or if you are unable to pay by card, please reach out to Carnegie_Nuclear_Policy_Conference@ceip.org.

Award presentation

2025 Thérèse Delpech Memorial Award

The Thérèse Delpech Memorial Award is offered, at each conference, to an individual who has rendered exceptional service to the nongovernmental nuclear policy community. While exceptional service includes major intellectual contributions to critical debates, it also encompasses the time-consuming and often unrecognized work that sustains and strengthens our community: mentoring young women and men; constructively critiquing the work of others; creating fora for discussion; building networks; and enhancing diversity, equity, and inclusion.

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Keynote

Keynote Speaker: Ambassador Rafael Mariano Grossi

Ambassador Rafael Mariano Grossi

Director General
International Atomic Energy Agency

Keynote

Keynote Speaker: The Honorable Christopher T. Hanson

The Honorable Christopher T. Hanson

Chair
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Panel

No One Likes U.S. Missile Defense Policy; What’s the Alternative?

Almost every commentator believes that the United States’ current missile defense policy goes either too far or not far enough. Critics argue that defending against even North Korean attacks is increasingly infeasible. Advocates believe the United States should try to defeat limited Chinese and Russian attacks against the homeland. What is the way forward? What kind of programs should the United States prioritize? How might China and Russia respond? What role does missile defense play in assuring allies? Should the United States be willing to put missile defense on the table in any future arms control negotiations?   

Jacek Durkalec

Staff officer, Net Assessment Section
North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Ankit Panda

Stanton senior fellow, Nuclear Policy Program
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Robert Soofer

Senior fellow, Forward Defense
Atlantic Council

Sanne Verschuren

Assistant professor of international security
Boston University

Panel

Why is China Building Up its Nuclear Forces? Does it Matter for U.S. Policy?

Rapid changes in the size of China’s nuclear arsenal, its development of new nuclear capabilities, and the persistent opacity about its goals have fueled speculation about Beijing’s motives. Is China abandoning its traditional posture of minimal deterrence and seeking to develop a nuclear arsenal that it can wield for aggressive purposes? Is it primarily interested in bolstering its status as a great power Or, does it simply seek to ensure the survivability of its nuclear forces? Finally, how—if at all—should the answer to these questions influence policy and military planning for the United States and its allies? 

Tong Zhao

Senior fellow, Nuclear Policy Program
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Oriana Skylar Mastro

Center fellow
Freeman Spogli Institue for International Studies, Stanford University

Wakana Mukai

Associate professor
Asia University

Anton La Guardia

Diplomatic editor
The Economist

Panel

The Great Power Consensus on Nonproliferation is Fraying; What Should be Done?

During the Cold War, a shared interest in stymying proliferation motivated extensive cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Since its end, however, the great powers have become increasingly interested in bolstering alliances at the expense of nonproliferation. China supports Pakistan’s nuclear program. Russia is formalizing its partnership with the DPRK and shielding Iran’s nuclear program from international censure. And, as the U.S.-India deal and the AUKUS submarine initiative exemplify, the United States’ wants exceptions to the rules it originally championed. What are the implications of this fraying great power commitment for nonproliferation? Are there circumstances that might revive cooperation? Can the nonproliferation regime be upheld in the absence of great-power consensus and what role might non-nuclear weapons states play? 

Sarah Bidgood

Postdoctoral fellow 
UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation

Kazuko Hikawa

Vice director, Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition 
Nagasaki University

Joelien Pretorius

Associate professor of political science
University of the Western Cape

Panel

Is Limited Nuclear War a Thing?

All nuclear-armed states appear to have military doctrines that include at least some role for limited nuclear strikes. At one end of the spectrum, France envisions a “final warning”—a single limited nuclear strike—before launching a massive attack; at the other, both Russia and the United States appear to plan for a protracted nuclear exchange. In all cases, nuclear-armed states assess that the ability to conduct less than all-out nuclear attacks enhances their capacity to deter nuclear and non-nuclear aggression. But what would happen if deterrence failed and nuclear weapons were used in a limited way? What pressures would leaders face to further escalate toward all-out nuclear war? To what extent would the fear of such an outcome help prevent escalation?  Is there a version of nuclear planning for limited strikes—French-style, U.S./Russian-style, or something else—that better achieves the goal of deterrence?

Héloïse Fayet 

Research fellow, Head of Deterrence & Proliferation Research Program 
Institut Français des Relations Internationales

Leonor Tomero

Vice president of government relations
J.A. Green & Co.

Krzysztof Wąsowski 

Counsellor, Department of Foreign Policy Strategy
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland

Nuclear Policy

The Nuclear Policy Program aims to reduce the risk of nuclear war. Our experts diagnose acute risks stemming from technical and geopolitical developments, generate pragmatic solutions, and use our global network to advance risk-reduction policies. Our work covers deterrence, disarmament, arms control, nonproliferation, and nuclear energy.

learn more

Nuclear Policy Conferences

See the agendas and watch videos from sessions in previous nuclear policy conferences.

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.