Rising Powers and the International Order

With the rise of both India and China, it has become increasingly important to understand how rising powers navigate the international order. In his book Ascending Order, Rohan Mukherjee examines the dynamics of rising powers in the international order by focusing on three cases: the United States and the maritime laws of war in the mid-nineteenth century, Japan and naval arms control in the interwar period, and India and nuclear non-proliferation in the Cold War. The book probes the question: When do rising powers cooperate with, challenge, or try to reform an international order?

Carnegie India hosted Rohan Mukherjee for a discussion on rising powers and their interactions with international institutions. The discussion was moderated by Srinath Raghavan.

DISCUSSION HIGHLIGHTS

• The United States during the nineteenth-century Atlantic system: Participants discussed the behavior of the United States as a rising power before and after the Concert of Europe in 1815. Before 1815, the international order was relatively open and fair, thereby attracting the United States’ cooperation, especially in the framing of the maritime laws of war. However, after 1815, participants noted that the international order became a closed club of conservative monarchies. During this period, the United States sought to expand the membership criteria of the great power club by positioning itself as the major contributor in the maritime domain. Participants explained how the United States pursued bilateral treaties on maritime war with the great powers throughout the 1820s, insisting on the exemption of private property from capture or attack during wars on the high seas. Such an exemption had economic benefits for the United States as a neutral maritime trading country. However, the great powers at the time, Britain and France, were unwilling to have maritime treaties that could be advantageous to the United States. It wasn’t until the Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law of 1856 that the properties of neutral countries were exempted from capture or attack during war. Participants emphasized that despite being its strongest proponent, the United States chose to oppose this declaration as Washington felt that it contained certain clauses that saw the United States relegated to a secondary power. Hence, the declaration became the first universal instrument of international law with one major exception—the United States—that remained its staunch opponent till the Hague convention superseded it in the early twentieth century. Overall, participants held that the U.S. diplomatic campaign to undermine the Paris Declaration was its way of asserting itself as a rising power.

• Japan in the Washington system: During the interwar period, Japan was at the receiving end of an unfair and biased international order. Participants agreed that the great powers treated Japan derisively at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. An instigated Japan then sought to reframe the criteria of measurement of great power status by demanding the inclusion of a clause on racial equality in the League of Nations. To Japan's disappointment, the proposal was overruled by the United States. Two years later, however, the United States and Britain proposed limiting naval construction. Furthermore, the former offered to scrap a much higher tonnage of warships than Japan. Participants underscored that this display of fairness influenced Japanese cooperation. Unfortunately, the period of cooperation was short-lived as the U.S. Congress passed a law in 1924 that effectively ended Japanese immigration into the United States. Participants noted that this was a blow to Japan’s status and ambitions. It subsequently accused the international order of being racist and became a major challenger to the great powers of the time.

• India during the Cold War: Participants also discussed India’s post-independence behavior with respect to nuclear non-proliferation. They remarked that the Indian leaders had been skeptical of the negotiations that led to the formation of the International Atomic Energy Association in 1957. Jawaharlal Nehru, Krishna Menon, and Homi Bhabha were all dissatisfied with the closed nature of deliberations amongst the great powers. They believed that the great powers should not ascertain the fate of the international order in terms of nuclear testing, disarmament, and non-proliferation. Indian leaders insisted on the expansion of the negotiating group by proposing that geography should be held as a criterion for membership. Their efforts led to the great powers agreeing to let Homi Bhabha preside over the International Conference on the Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy in Geneva in 1955. Participants noted that after getting an equal seat at the table, India sincerely pursued agreements on nuclear testing and non-proliferation. Even China’s nuclear test did not alter New Delhi’s commitment to the international order. India also became a prominent member of the United Nations’ eighteen-nation Committee on Disarmament in 1962, which consisted of non-aligned nations. Participants acknowledged that the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 was an important outcome of this committee and a major victory for the non-aligned nations in bringing the great powers to compromise. However, the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons prevented new nuclear powers from joining the club, thereby strengthening the monopoly the great powers enjoyed. As a result, participants explained, there was an erosion of consensus within the Indian establishment, and New Delhi began objecting to the international order thereafter.

This event summary was prepared by Adyasha A. Das, a research intern at Carnegie India.