2013 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference

Yukiya Amano is director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Amano served as chair of the agency’s Board of Governors from September 2005 to September 2006 and was Japan’s resident representative to the agency from 2005 until his election as director general in July 2009. At the Japanese Foreign Ministry, Amano was director general for the Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Science Department from 2002 until 2005. He previously served as a governmental expert on the UN Panel on Missiles and on the UN Expert Group on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education. A graduate of the Tokyo University Faculty of Law, Amano joined the Japanese Foreign Ministry in April 1972, when he began a series of international postings in Belgium, France, Laos, Switzerland, and the United States.

The ratification of New START appears to be the high-water mark for arms reduction efforts, with Russia and the United States still apparently far apart on a negotiating mandate for a next round. And with the exception of the nuclear security summit process, progress on the other initiatives laid out by President Obama in Prague in April 2009 has been slow going. The nuclear abolition movement, despite statements from very prominent former U.S. officials, has failed to garner sustained international support. There has been no progress on FMCT negotiations and CTBT ratification in a number of key states. Do the governments of China and Russia embrace the logic of the Prague agenda and share an understanding of strategic stability with the United States? What evidence exists that other leaders share Obama’s interest in this agenda? What can be done to reinvigorate reciprocal progress on nonproliferation and disarmament?

Allison Macfarlane is chair of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Before her confirmation in June 2012, Macfarlane was an associate professor of environmental science and policy at George Mason University. From 2010 to 2012, she served on the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future, created by the Obama administration to make recommendations about a national strategy for dealing with the nation’s high-level nuclear waste. 

Matthew Wald is an energy and environment reporter for the New York Times, where he has been writing about energy topics for thirty years.

NPT countries agreed at the 2010 Review Conference on “the need for all states at all times to comply with applicable international law, including humanitarian law.” A coalition of governments and civil society groups has now mobilized to draw attention to the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. Thirty-four countries and the Holy See have agreed to press the nuclear-weapon states to outlaw nuclear weapons for humanitarian reasons. Do all nuclear-armed states accept that humanitarian law is applicable to their policies of nuclear deterrence and possible use? How could the use of nuclear weapons be consistent with humanitarian law? Conversely, if using nuclear weapons were the only way for a state to defeat a survival-threatening aggression, how could considerations of humanitarian law be reconciled with the right to self-defense? More broadly, if the perceived security imperatives of nuclear deterrence cannot be reconciled with sparing innocent life, what are the implications for international politics and the future of the nonproliferation regime? Does the legal debate actually matter or is this really about delegitimizing nuclear weapons?

Nina Tannenwald, Elbridge A. Colby, Benno Laggner, and Li Bin discuss the humanitarian dimensions of nuclear war, deterrence and disarmament. Share your comments and questions below.

Leaders in many non-nuclear-weapon states feel under siege from a growing barrage of nonproliferation initiatives, such the Additional Protocol, new Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines, and advanced safeguards mechanisms. Aspiring nuclear-power states, particularly those with no history of WMD programs and no advanced dual-use industries, sometimes question the merit of investing in comprehensive proliferation controls. They also resent the fact that the nonproliferation agenda is pushed hard by the nuclear-weapon states while the prospects for complete nuclear disarmament remain grim. What is the right balance to be struck between these two pillars of the NPT? What are the respective obligations of the nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states to work in “good faith” toward disarmament under NPT Article VI? Can the nonproliferation regime be significantly strengthened in the absence of significant steps toward the goal of nuclear disarmament? 

Scott Sagan, Christopher Ford, Alfredo Labbé, and Harald Müller answer these questions and more. Share your comments and questions below. 

In the coming years, new fuel cycle technologies—notably laser enrichment and pyroprocessing— may be commercialized, sparking a vigorous debate about their proliferation impacts. Advocates and critics have, however, tended to talk at cross-purposes. The former have argued that safeguards can effectively mitigate proliferation risks while the latter have argued that, once a technology is commercialized, its diffusion is more-or-less inevitable. These issues are of huge policy significance. Within the United States, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is currently considering a petition asking it to conduct nonproliferation impact assessments of new technologies. Meanwhile, negotiations between the United States and South Korea over a renewal of their nuclear cooperation agreement have foundered on the question of pyroprocessing. So, what proliferation concerns are associated with new fuel cycle technologies? Have they been overblown? How should we assess proliferation risks? And, who should perform the assessment?

Jeffrey Lewis, Soon Heung Chang, Nancy Jo Nicholas, and Francis Slakey address these questions. Share your comments and questions below. 

A large-scale effective cyberattack could bring a highly complex modern society to its knees. Similarly, attacks on space assets could make it impossible to control military forces, including nuclear forces. Because of the severe consequences, some believe the threat of nuclear retaliation is appropriate as a deterrent. Is there a role for nuclear weapons in deterring a space attack or a cyberattack? If so, what is it? If not, how are such attacks to be deterred?

Linton Brooks, Sergey Rogov, and Xu Weidi discuss the role of nuclear weapons in deterring a space attack or a cyberattack. Share your comments and questions below.

The Conference on Disarmament has lost traction, and it seems clear that it will not initiate negotiations on an FMCT unless Pakistan (and maybe others) decides to join the consensus. CTBT ratification has slowed and entry into force is a distant possibility at best. Prospects for a nuclear weapons convention are even dimmer. Amid this gloomy outlook, are these treaties vital to progress on nonproliferation and disarmament? Is there a future for universal treaties? Can ad hoc measures, such as those seen in recent years in the area of nuclear security, offer an alternative path, and if so in what areas?

Deepti Choubey,  Christoph Eichhorn, Maleeha Lodhi, and William Potter discuss the future of universal treaties. Share your comments and questions below.

After Fukushima, many states shelved plans to build new reactors or phase out existing ones. India, Russia, and the United Kingdom are three important exceptions. Russia and India both have multiple units under construction and ambitious long-term plans for more. However, further reactor exports to India (including from Russia) appear to have foundered on India’s new liability law. Meanwhile, the UK government may be pro-nuclear and the United Kingdom may have been a nuclear energy pioneer, but new reactors remain in doubt because of financing. Why have these three states remained pro-nuclear? Will they be able to implement their plans? Will the United Kingdom offer explicit subsidies to get projects started? Will Russia and India reduce subsidies over time? And, how will public opinion, the cheap price of natural gas, liability issues, and continued challenges of waste management affect nuclear energy policy?

Oliver Morton, Mark Hibbs, Gürkan Kumbaroğlu, and M.V. Ramana discuss the future of nuclear energy in the aftermath of Fukushima. Share your comments and questions below.

M. J. Chung is a seven-term member of the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea. He is a former chairman of the Grand National Party and was also a presidential candidate in 2002. Chung is the chairman of the board of trustees of Ulsan University and the Asan Foundation, the largest philanthropic organization in Korea. In 2011, he launched the Asan Nanum (˝sharing˝) Foundation, which seeks to foster entrepreneurship and leadership among young Koreans. He served as vice president of FIFA (Federation Internationale de Football Association), the world governing body of football, and as co-chairman of the Korean Organizing Committee for the 2002 Korea-Japan FIFA World Cup. Chung received his bachelor’s in economics from Seoul National University, a master’s of science from the Sloan School of Management at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and a doctorate in international relations from the School of Advanced International Studies at the Johns Hopkins University.

M. J. Chung delivered a keynote speech under the title Thinking the Unthinkable on the Korean Peninsula. Share your questions and comments below.

The Fukushima nuclear disaster forced a global re-think about the safety of nuclear power. Where once there seemed to be consensus about a nuclear renaissance, now there is diversity of views about the future of the industry, and some states have even begun to transition away from nuclear power. Can nuclear power programs be managed safely and securely? With are the implications if states decide that safety issues cannot be managed? What are the lessons that nuclear operators should take from Fukushima?

U.S. Deputy Secretary of Energy Daniel Poneman, Tatsujiro Suzuki from the Japan Atomic Energy Commission, and the World Association of Nuclear Operators' George Felgate discuss lessons learned from the Fukushima disaster and its implications on nuclear safety. Share your questions and comments below. 

In return for the ratification of New START, the Obama administration committed to an expensive program to revitalize the U.S. nuclear enterprise. Since then, however, pressure for austerity has grown, and the U.S. economy has limped forward under the threat—and then the reality—of sequestration. The Obama administration has promised to try to protect spending on nuclear weapons. But, should it? What would be the strategic consequences—to both deterrence and assurance—of cutting the nuclear budget? If cost savings from the nuclear enterprise are necessary, what should be cut? Should the United States make one or two major cuts, such as abandoning one leg of the triad, or instead spread the pain evenly? How much can it save by doing so?

Walter Pincus, Barry Blechman, Eric Edelman, Garrett Harencak, and David Mosher look at the different scenarios facing the United States. Share your comments and questions below.

The 2010 NPT Review Conference Action Plan endorsed the convening in 2012 of a “zone free of nuclear and other WMD” conference to be attended by all states in the Middle East. The conference was postponed due to turmoil in the region and Israeli resistance. Could the verifiable elimination of all WMD capabilities from the Middle East be feasible in the absence of stable and transparent governments in all the region’s states? In the midst of civil war in Syria, uncertainty in Lebanon and Jordan, political instability in Egypt, Iranian noncompliance with IAEA and UN Security Council requirements for transparency and confidence building, and paralysis in Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy, what is the value of focusing on a WMD-free zone? If key governments and political movements do not recognize Israel’s right to exist, what interest would Israel have in putting all of its nuclear materials and activities under international safeguards, thereby eliminating its nuclear deterrent? How do Islamist parties in the region understand these issues?

David Ignatius, Shahram Chubin, Dore Gold, and Mahmoud Karem look at how countries in the Middle East view these issues. Share your comments and questions below.

The Carnegie Endowment’s Nuclear Policy Program had the honor to present the inaugural Thérèse Delpech Memorial Award on April 9 at the Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference to Ambassador Linton F. Brooks. 

The award is offered, every other year, to an individual who has rendered exceptional service to the nongovernmental nuclear policy community. While exceptional service includes major intellectual contributions to critical debates, it also encompasses the time-consuming and often unrecognized work needed to sustain and strengthen our community: mentoring young women and men, constructively critiquing the work of others, creating fora for discussion, and building networks. Such activities benefit the community as a whole in its efforts to reduce nuclear dangers. Importantly, the award is also intended to recognize individuals who, through friendship, collegiality, and respect, help mold a collection of individual researchers into a community worthy of the name. 

In short, the award recognizes exceptional creativity, integrity, humanity, and amity—four qualities embodied by Thérèse Delpech, a long-time strategic adviser to the French Atomic Energy Commission, an author, and a distinguished public intellectual. Thérèse passed away in January 2012; as we planned our 2013 conference we realized that she would be sorely missed, and that one way to celebrate her life would be to establish an award in her name. 

No one better embodies the qualities we seek to recognize with this award than its first winner, Linton Brooks. Following a long and distinguished career in government service, Linton has made—and is continuing to make—tremendous contributions to the nongovernmental nuclear policy community, in particular through his dedication to mentoring successor generations. As we noted on the award plaque, Linton is “second to none” in the wisdom, creativity, humor, and nonpartisan leadership he brings to this field. 

Linton Brooks is an independent consultant on national security issues, a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a distinguished research fellow at the National Defense University, and an adviser to six U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) national laboratories. Ambassador Brooks served from July 2002 to January 2007 as administrator of DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration, where he was responsible for the U.S. nuclear weapons program and for DOE’s international nuclear nonproliferation programs. His government career has included service as deputy administrator for nuclear nonproliferation at the National Nuclear Security Administration, assistant director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, chief U.S. negotiator for the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, and director of defense programs and arms control on the National Security Council staff. Ambassador Brooks holds degrees in physics from Duke University and in government and politics from the University of Maryland, and he is a distinguished graduate of the U.S. Naval War College.

India, Turkey, and Brazil are often held up as prominent examples of emerging powers in terms of growing economic and political clout as well as influence in the nuclear order. Ankara and Brasilia famously teamed up in 2010 to try to rescue the Tehran Research Reactor deal after negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 broke down. India reached accommodation with the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and is now being promoted for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. But is there a common “emerging power” agenda in the nuclear area? How do relations between these countries and the established powers (specifically the United States) impact their nuclear policies? If so, what interests do these states share, and what does it mean for efforts to continue to strengthen the regime? How much disarmament would emerging powers regard as sufficient to support further strengthening of nonproliferation rules? Do emerging powers seeking greater representation in international bodies such as the NSG and the UN Security Council aim to strengthen or weaken these bodies’ authority to make and enforce rules that may limit state activities?

Togzhan Kassenova, Matias Spektor, Sinan Ülgen, and Nirupama Rao discuss what interests these states share, and what  it means for efforts to continue to strengthen the nonproliferation regime. Share your comments and questions below.

Balancing the U.S. commitments to reduce the number and role of nuclear weapons while strengthening extended deterrence and assuring allies has emerged as a significant challenge in the new security environment. This challenge is all the greater because what may deter Russia and China may not deter North Korea or a nuclear-armed Iran and may not be well suited to reassuring America’s allies in Europe, Northeast Asia and the Middle East. What kind of measures or policies can satisfy these criteria? What potential steps might exacerbate the challenge?

Brad Roberts, Łukasz Kulesa, Jiří Šedivý, and Koji Tomita take a look at what kind of measures or policies can satisfy these criteria and what potential steps might exacerbate the challenge. Share your comments and questions below.

Are states with nuclear weapons immune from externally driven efforts to promote regime change? Libya’s Qaddafi came clean, was driven from power, and ultimately killed by rebels. North Korea has nuclear weapons, and the Kim family still retains power. How do states like Iran interpret these examples? What lessons do these cases hold for Western powers? For Russia and China? Are regime change policies justified by nuclear proliferation by outlier states?

Ellen Laipson, Antonio Guerriero, Bijan Khajehpour, Danielle Pletka, and Bruno Tertrais discuss these cases and more. Share your comments and questions below.

Unprecedented United Nations Security Council sanctions have been levied on Iran and North Korea in an attempt to compel compliance with nonproliferation and international commitments. Are these sanctions working, and by what measures should we assess effectiveness? What type of sanctions—technology, oil, financial, luxury goods, individual travel, or other—can best achieve the desired results? What are the avenues or mechanisms through which sanctions are expected to “work?” How can we better translate economic impact into behavior changes? How can the humanitarian costs of sanctions be minimized? And if sanctions are not effective, what other tools should be used to address nonproliferation compliance?

Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs Carl Bildt and Harvard University Professor Meghan O'Sullivan discuss the efficacy of sanctions on Iran and North Korea for nonproliferation. What would you like to ask Carl Bildt? Share your comments and questions below.