Crux of Asia Conference

As the United States undertakes its strategic rebalancing to the Asia Pacific, Chinese and Indian views are of particular importance to Washington. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt M. Campbell offered an inside perspective on the past, present, and future of the U.S. role as a Pacific power. 

• Trends of Thought: Campbell identified five broad trends in contemporary American thinking about Asia, all of which have various influences on policy: 
  
  
  1. A Potential Partner: A first line of thought sees China’s rise as the focus of all Asia policy, but does not view the U.S.-Chinese relationship as necessarily adversarial. 
  
  
  2. An Inherent Threat: A second, related group of thinkers views China as inherently threatening, a sort of modern-day Soviet Union with which the United States must inevitably compete. 
  
  
  3. Issue-Based: Others take an issue-based stance, recalibrating policy based on shifting priorities in fields ranging from democratization to terrorism. 
  
  
  4. Partnerships: A fourth category encompasses those who prioritize multilateral partnerships in creating a security architecture that guarantees a peaceful Asia. 
  
  
  5. Transnational Threats: A final group orients itself around emerging transnational threats such as climate change and energy security.


• Multifaceted, Sustained Engagement: Campbell emphasized that successful Asia-Pacific policy depends on the United States maintaining close ties with all its partners in the region on a whole-of-government basis. While the military component of the American rebalancing to Asia usually receives the most attention, Campbell added, Washington’s diplomatic efforts are the policy’s real leading edge. It follows that the United States must get its budgetary house in order to reassure the global community that it can make good on its promise.


• Rebalance the Rebalancing: Campbell countered the common narrative that the rebalancing comes at the expense or against the wishes of European U.S. allies. He explained that Washington’s traditional allies across the Atlantic share its belief that the Asia Pacific will be a major inflection point in the twenty-first century, and that they therefore support renewed American interest in the region. Likewise, Campbell underscored that the rebalance does not only enhance Washington’s focus on Asia in general, but broadens it from traditional hotspots in northeast Asia to include the entire continent.

China and India have flourished thanks to the existing economic and geopolitical international order, yet neither nation is fully content with the status quo. David Shambaugh of the George Washington University outlined and commented on papers by Chinese experts Wang Jisi and Zhang Yunling; Frederic Grare of the Carnegie Endowment did the same for Indian analysts C. Raja Mohan and Rajiv Kumar. Carnegie’s Ashley J. Tellis moderated the discussion and offered an American perspective on the future of the international system.

•  Whither Westphalia? Shambaugh and Grare explained that both India and China have strong commitments to state sovereignty as the fundamental principle of the global order. Both panelists commented that the two states wrestle with ongoing border and territorial disputes that sensitize them to potential violations of sovereignty. But the two countries diverge somewhat in the details, they added. While Beijing takes an absolute stance on sovereignty, objecting to intervention on any grounds, New Delhi’s dedication to individual rights prompts it to see sovereignty in more flexible terms. Indian discomfort with interventions, Grare explained, finds its roots in practicality—not principles.


• Decades in the Making: Tellis outlined the history of the current U.S.-backed global order, tracing its origins to the liberal institutions that emerged after the Second World War to promote open markets and an end to offensive war. All three panelists credited China and India’s rise to their active participation in the existing international economic and governance system. Shambaugh argued, however, that China does not always contribute to the existing system commensurate with its significant wealth and influence. 


• The Balance and Power: Beijing and New Delhi acknowledge that they have benefited tremendously from this order, Shambaugh and Grare explained, but they are nonetheless dissatisfied with what they perceive as its dominance by the West at the expense of the developing world. But as Tellis pointed out, whether or not China and India truly support a more democratic global governance regime often depends on the realities of power politics. China, for instance, claims to support a more representative United Nations, but balks at the idea of a permanent Security Council seat for India.

China and India’s economic growth have provided both states with closer ties to their neighbors and an increased capacity to shape the region’s future. Xia Liping of Tongji University and Srikanth Kondapalli of Jawaharlal Nehru University analyzed Chinese and Indian visions for the Asia Pacific, paying particular attention to ongoing disputes and Washington’s role in their neighborhood. Dan Blumenthal of the American Enterprise Institute moderated the discussion.

• Territory and More: The panelists described a complex network of regional and bilateral concerns that shape Indo-Chinese relations with each other and their neighbors. For India, Kondapelli explained, disputed territory along its borders with Pakistan and China continues to occupy center stage. Xia painted a more expansive picture of China’s regional concerns, listing the South and East China Sea disputes as well as the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs as chief among China’s worries. 


• An Asian Community: In Xia’s view, China aims to become a “responsible” regional power, helping to create a regional Asian order based around the welfare of the people of the region. But Beijing faces a dilemma, he added: a more active role in the region spurs what he sees as paranoia about China’s motivations, while a more restrained posture is met with allegations that China free rides without paying its fair share.


• Looking East—and West: Kondapalli credited the current Indian government for its efforts to build closer economic and security ties with its neighbors and other stakeholders in the region. Citing myriad trade initiatives alongside collective security peacekeeping and counter-piracy missions, he argued that India’s increased outreach helps create a more stable and prosperous Asia.


• America’s Role: The two contributors took sharply divergent stances on U.S. policy in the Asia Pacific. China, Xia said, sees a robust and increasing American presence in the region as giving carte blanche to smaller powers that confront China in a manner both unjust and destabilizing. Kondapalli explained that New Delhi, conversely, welcomes the United States into an inclusive regional order, embracing the traditional American status as a principal guarantor of open global commons. He cautioned, however, that India is sensitive to losing its strategic autonomy and is especially uncomfortable with the idea of U.S.-Chinese “spheres of influence” that would marginalize India as a regional power. Offering an American perspective, Blumenthal remarked that the United States sees no security threat from India and welcomes its emergence as a fellow liberal democracy, but that many American policymakers see China’s actions as “opaque and destabilizing,” questioning whether Beijing is sincere in its pledge to defend public goods.

Chinese scholar Shen Dingli and Indian scholar Bharath Gopalaswamy joined moderator Kevin Pollpeter for a discussion of developments on the final frontier and how they affect relations between their respective countries. Panelists discussed the ways that space opens the door to both competition and cooperation between nations.

Competition

• Independent Power, Independent System: Both authors emphasized that their countries have a reasonable right to establish their own satellite networks for telecommunication and global positioning services. No country, they argued, should be forced to be dependent on another for such information.   


• Weaponization: Both authors similarly affirmed that their countries are not interested in launching a new arms race in space. However, both Shen and Gopalaswamy discussed China’s recent expansion of its anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, with Shen cautiously hoping that China is backing away from the program and Gopalaswamy warning that any additional testing will a prompt response from India.


• Deterrence: Shen made it clear that even in the case of ASAT development China’s interest in weaponizing space has been in the pursuit of deterrence, noting that employing such capabilities offensively would be “suicidal.” 


• Resource Allocation: Pollpeter noted that one of the major challenges confronting the future of space relations is managing the limited amount of orbital space available. 

Cooperation

• Space Situational Awareness: Addressing the prospects for cooperation in space, Gopalaswamy pointed to the need for greater Space Situational Awareness, such as monitoring for near-earth objects and dangerous debris, as a potential arena for joint efforts between India, China, and others.


• Toward an International Code of Conduct? Shen and Gopalaswamy indicated that China and India would both need to be involved in any efforts to develop an international code of conduct aimed at reducing the potential areas of friction between countries in space.

Crux of Asia authors Zha Daojiong of China and Sunjoy Joshi of India joined co-editor Sean Mirski for a panel discussing the security implications of energy resource management in the region. The panelists treated not only the current trends in the energy sector, but also engaged with the possibilities for future developments.

• A Contentious Order: Both Zha and Joshi indicated that the current global energy order, which Mirski described as resting on the back of American naval hegemony, might be unsustainable as their countries continue to gain clout and influence across the region.


• Regulatory Risks: Joshi pointed out that every major energy crisis has been caused largely by domestic regulatory failures rather than by international turmoil. He noted that India’s extensive subsidies for energy, amounting to 2 percent of the country’s GDP, represent a major hurdle to India’s energy future.


• Lack of Planning: Zha pointed out that China’s policy to date has been largely unarticulated, with no dedicated ministry for energy or even a strategic plan. He described China’s approach as being one that “walks on all different legs”—meaning that China has been content to switch between sources as circumstances have required.


• A Private Future: Joshi and Zha both suggested that allowing more private, market-based mechanisms for resource allocation will be a near inevitability. They indicated that both countries should be looking for ways to allow the state to recede from its prominent role in the energy sector in the coming years.