Challenges to Strategic Stability in Southern Asia

IMGXYZ13643IMGZYXFollowing two panels illuminating the strategic context presently dominating relations between China, India, and Pakistan, the conference concluded with a presentation focusing on the implications for U.S. foreign policy. The panelists were U.S. Navy Admiral (ret.) Timothy Keating and Jack Gill of the National Defense University. John Foster, co-chair of the Nuclear Strategy Forum, moderated.

• Defining U.S. Interests: Any discussion of U.S. policy must begin with a discussion of how the United States defines its interests in a particular situation, explained one panelist. In southern Asia, he said that these interests might include:
  
  
  • Ensuring stable domestic politics and advancing levels of economic development throughout the region.
  
  
  • Preserving free and open sea lanes for commercial purposes, given that at least 90 percent of the world’s manufactured goods pass through sea lanes in that region at some point in their life cycle.
  
  
  • Securing the United States from conventional and non-conventional threats, including international terror groups and nuclear weapons.


• Changing Circumstances: Panelists agreed that the United States must prepare itself for rapidly changing conditions in this region, including tenser, more militarized borders and the movement of power projection capabilities to sea.


• Continued Engagement: One panelist strongly advocated for continuous U.S. involvement in the region, saying that in the minds of many within the region the United States remains an “indispensable partner,” even if that is not true on all issues or occasions. The panelist recommended that the United States find new ways to maintain a palpable presence that do not necessarily involve “boots on the ground,” noting that U.S. partners find the relationship more comfortable when U.S. presence is nearby but not too close to home.

For South Asia’s three nuclear-armed powers, each with its own strategic objectives and nuclear philosophies, defining and practicing deterrence can be a tall order. Georgetown University’s Christine Fair, Carnegie’s Lora Saalman, Keith Payne of the National Institute for Public Policy, and Stephen Cohen of the Brookings Institution explored the principles of deterrence in South Asia and what futures Pakistan, China, and India might see for their strategic arsenals. Carnegie’s Ashley J. Tellis moderated.

Conceptualizing Deterrence

• An Exercise in Perceptions: The panel emphasized that deterrence isn’t just a numbers game,. Deterrence depends on each actor’s perceptions of itself and of its adversaries. This is especially relevant in South Asia, where nuclear-armed states can differ tremendously in their understanding of each other’s redlines and the potential sanctions that crossing them might incur.


• Internal Destabilizers: One analyst pointed out that some of the greatest threats to stability stem from internal structural factors within a given state. For instance, the lack of honest self-assessment might increase an actor’s tolerance for risk, or an underdeveloped command and control infrastructure could create uncertainty about the potential use of nuclear weapons.


• Absolute Goals, Immediate Action: A refusal to compromise or engage with adversaries can create regional instability. Several participants expressed concern that if a state refuses to concede defeat or believes it faces an immediate threat, it may be more likely to move towards deploying nuclear weapons—especially if that state believes it lacks a credible second-strike capability.


• A Unique Environment: One analyst held that South Asia may be particularly vulnerable to misperceptions and miscalculations. Unlike the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, Asia suffers a wide disparity in nuclear doctrines and is home to three nuclear powers that can interact in any number of unforeseeable ways.

Pakistan, Nuclear Weapons, and Limited Conflict

• A Defensive Patrimony: Since its inception in 1947, Pakistan has taken a defensive posture against what it views as an aggressive and threatening India, one participant explained. As a result, Pakistan has been a consistently revisionist state, and it has not hesitated to use non-state militant proxies to try to coerce India to abandon the disputed region of Kashmir.


• Steady Escalation: Pakistan has seen jihad as a viable political tool since at least the mid-1970s, the analyst continued. The Pakistani government has grown increasingly ambitious in its support of militant groups over the years, the analyst argued—especially after Pakistan’s successful nuclear tests in 1998, which Islamabad views as insurance against a conventional Indian reprisal.


• Historical Blinders: One participant asserted that Pakistan does not acknowledge any of its past military conflicts as a failure. In Islamabad’s eyes, only the acceptance of Indian regional hegemony would mean defeat, which creates a potentially perilous tolerance for risk.

China’s Nuclear Conversation

• Looking Toward India: Beijing’s nuclear arsenal is increasingly oriented around its India policy, one participant pointed out. The Chinese may believe that New Delhi aspires to “comprehensive national power” and regional hegemony, and that nuclear weapons may prove a useful tool for containing India. 


• A Struggle for Definition: China thinks of nuclear weapons as a broad, traditional deterrent, one panelist argued, but Beijing has concerns about falling victim to the kinds of low-intensity conflicts that India and Pakistan have fought under their nuclear umbrella. China worries that India’s nuclear arsenal could embolden it to act against limited Chinese interests without fear of retaliation, the analyst asserted. 


• Mirrored Perceptions: One participant explored the interplaybetween Indian and Chinese nuclear commentary, raising the question that Chinese policymakers could be both projecting their own views onto India and adopting certain Indian perceptions in their analyses.

IMGXYZ13642IMGZYXWith widespread uncertainty in the wake of increased military maneuvers in southern and eastern Asia, three experts on the region offered their perspectives on its strategic environment. Carnegie’s George Perkovich, Neil Joeck from the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory at the University of California, Berkeley, and Dan Blumenthal of the American Enterprise Institute joined the National Institute for Public Policy’s Bob Joseph for a discussion on the motivations of key actors in the region. 

India

• Looking Outward: One panelist argued that India’s nuclear posture is driven by its perceptions of its two nuclear neighbors, China and Pakistan. Domestically, the panelist explained, India’s strategic community uses the threat posed by these countries to shape its own development of new technologies. 


• Threat Environment: India’s threat environment was characterized by a panelist as unique, consisting of a seamless spectrum ranging from sub-conventional militant groups all the way up to nuclear weapons. This continuum presents enhanced risk of escalation if India were to respond conventionally to a sub-conventional attack, the panelist asserted—especially if Pakistan interpreted that conventional reaction as an escalation rather than as a tit-for-tat response.


• Missile Defense: Though much has been made about India’s desire for limited ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities, one panelist held that these aspirations may be as much fantasy as fact given the extraordinary technical challenges to developing an operational BMD system. 

Pakistan

• Confrontation: Pakistan’s origins as an insecure state in a defensive position still influence how its officials interpret their strategic position, claimed one panelist. As a result, Pakistan sees itself as locked in constant confrontation with India not just for regional influence but for its own survival. 


• Competition: Due to this confrontation mentality, a panelist said, Pakistan continues to expand on its nuclear capabilities. The panelist warned that while Pakistan has made advances in terms of uranium and plutonium conversion and warhead delivery systems, its command and control protocol has not kept pace. This failure introduces greater uncertainty into the region’s strategic calculus. 


• Conflict: Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine has steadily evolved from merely “Deter India” to “Deter India and Defeat India in the Event of Conflict,” claimed one panelist. This doctrine strongly affects decisionmaking when it comes to Pakistan’s nuclear posture.  


• Cooperation: Even against this relatively grim backdrop, there is still a chance that current conditions can lead to a path of cooperation between the three nuclear powers, a panelist contended. The panelist suggested that Pakistan’s economic opening with India and its history of close-but-not-too-close relations with China offer some hope.  

China

• Looking Farther: Understanding China’s posture requires understanding that China is looking farther than either Pakistan or India, according to one panelist. Chinese modernization is not driven primarily by regional relationships but by global ones and ties with the United States in particular.  


• Stated Doctrine and Reality: A panelist cautioned against assuming that China’s nuclear actual doctrine corresponds directly with its articulated positions, especially with regard to its No First Use policy. The panelist said that there is some evidence that these doctrines are less fixed than the Chinese publically acknowledge. 


• Responses: In response to China’s growing prominence, one panelist recommended that the United States and India work together through public diplomacy to hold China to its international commitments, including involving China in strategic arms reduction talks from now on and directly addressing the issue of monitoring from space.