European Security Strategy and its Impact on the United States and China

IMGXYZ1162IMGZYXAs NATO approaches its 60th anniversary next month, there has been much discussion on the future of transatlantic relations and European security strategy.  Carnegie Beijing, The Renmin University Centre for European Studies (CESRUC), and the United Nations University (UNU-CRIS) jointly sponsored a conference to further analyze relations between the European Union, the United States, and China. 

Successes and Failures of European Security Policy
Sven Biscop, Director of the Security and Global Governance Programme at the Royal Institute for International Relations, discussed the current state of EU defense policy.  Biscop characterized it as lacking clear goals, strategic objectives, or mechanisms for action.  For example, the 2008 Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy listed almost the same global challenges and threats as those outlined in the 2003 report. 

The failings of the report are representative of larger systemic problems: vaguely defined European defense policy, unclear defense priorities, proper instruments of execution, and a struggle for internal unity.  The cumulative result is that NATO and the EU are underperforming. According to Biscop, commitment to implementing unified security policy remains an underlying challenge.  If the EU wants to possess a decisive leadership role in the world and act as a strong partner for the U.S., it must act as one.  Decisions, particularly ones concerning diplomacy and defense, should be made at the EU level; stronger and more comprehensive dialogue should be established between Brussels and Washington.


EU-U.S.-China Trilateral Relations
Andrew Small, a Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund, analyzed the EU-U.S.-China dynamic and the future of trilateral relations.  Small described EU-China relations as heavily influenced by the U.S.: most EU policy towards China uses the U.S. as a reference point. 

The assumption that Europe will pursue policy respectful of American interests, however, was tested in 2005 when it strongly considered lifting the 1989 arms embargo on China.  Small saw this move as a response to the unilateral policy approach of the U.S. between 2002 and 2006, which drew the EU and China closer together as Europe sought to balance U.S. power.  Though the U.S. increased its engagement with Europe thereafter, EU-China policy has been largely directed by European politics and its increasingly global focus since then.

In terms of the future, the talk of a “G-2” has caused anxiety in Europe.  There is fear that the EU will be subordinated by improved US-China relations.  Though Small contended that an “official” G-2 relationship is unrealistic, it is shorthand for a failed transatlantic relationship: if the Europeans cannot step up as an international player and China continues to increase its leadership role, strains may indeed appear between the US and EU.  On the other hand, tense US-Sino relations might strengthen those ties.  Either scenario only reiterates the need for Europe to act as a unified international player.


A Historical Analysis of the Transatlantic Relationship
Stan Sloan, visiting scholar at the Rohatyn Center for International Affairs at Middlebury College, offered a historical perspective of the transatlantic relationship.  Much of his analysis focused on the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 and the creation of NATO.  Many in the U.S. believe the EU contributes less than its share to NATO, while for the Europeans NATO too often represents US policy preferences, not European interests.  Because of these differences in perception, NATO and coordinated cooperation have become difficult, in not ineffective.

Sloan suggested that if the EU was able to define its interests better it would be more committed to executing defense initiatives through NATO.  He described the 2008 Report as something of an extension of the Treaty of 1949: the EU’s definition of perceived threats and responses has not spurred sufficient action. Part of the problem is the conflicting perceptions each partner has of the other: Europeans believe the U.S. relies too much on its “hard power” while Americans criticize the EU for relying too heavily on its “soft power.”  If this divide persists, U.S. and EU responses to global threats will continue to move further apart. NATO can still play an important role in world affairs, but until the European security defense policy is given more room to define and deal with security problems, it will continue to be ineffective. 


Future Security Concerns and the Need for Global Cooperation
The last featured speaker, Feng Zhongping, director of the Institute of European Studies in the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, focused on the need for cooperation free from existing international organizations or bilateralism.  He pointed to the increasing irrelevance of NATO since the end of the Cold War, and U.S. policy toward the Middle East, as examples where international organizations and unilateralism respectively, have failed.  He warned that a more robust EU-US partnership would find a similar fate, as would a G-2 relationship. 

Instead Feng advocated a policy of global cooperation that would include China, India, and other emerging countries.  Traditionally, international organizations have failed to include these actors, yet few initiatives could be successfully executed without them today.  Global concerns require concerted, global action and success will not come by decisions of a privileged few.


Questions & Answers
Debate over the relevance of NATO was particularly contentious.  Ian Taylor, professor of international relations at St. Andrews University and visiting professor in CESRUC, asserted that the tendency for the U.S. to criticize the EU for its “failure” to “do its part” is often code word for supporting American policy.  He characterized the very formation of NATO as a means to project American power in post-war Europe. 

Francis Baert, project researcher at UNU-CRIS, advocated dismantling NATO, which he believed would give Europe the chance to begin a unified foreign defense policy and clarify its role. NATO lies at the roots of Europe’s pluralism.  Because of it, Europe tries to be “everything and nothing” and achieves little as a result. 

Stan Sloan responded by asking what could reasonably take the place of NATO today when there is not united European actor in defense or foreign policy.  Europeans must first accept that they will be led by a single government before they can be.  NATO must continue because the world does not have an alternative.

Lastly, participants discussed shared areas of cooperation, including the global financial crisis.  Zha Daojiong, professor at the School of International Studies in Peking University, voiced concern that the EU and U.S. may work together without addressing major issues that contributed to the financial crisis, i.e., disciplining rating agencies like Moody’s.  While Americans want the markets to take care of the problem, other countries, like Germany, want to bring systematic change to economic behavior.  As Shi Yinhong, professor at the School of International Studies in Remin University, concluded: America doesn’t want to do this and China is not ready to do this; Europe is crucial.

Other Participants: Linda Jakobson, Liqun Zhu, Huipu Zhao, Yinhong Shi, Canrong Jin, Xiaojin Zhang, Tianhong Luo, Lexian Fang, Su Lin, Wenxiu Liu, Zhenyu Wu, Liyun Liu, Qinsi Li, Hong Tang, Chaizhen Han