The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START): What Should the Follow-Up Be?

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), an integral part of the bilateral nuclear relationship between Russia and the United States, will expire in December 2009. To discuss what should replace the treaty, the Carnegie Moscow Center hosted Ambassador Linton Brooks, the United States’ chief negotiator during the 1991 START talks.

Neither country wishes to extend the treaty in its current form, which includes burdensome verification measures, but divergent approaches to arms control and an increasingly tense political relationship complicate the re-negotiation process. Nevertheless, successful conclusion of a follow-on treaty is critical to better U.S.-Russian relations and continuity in the strategic nuclear relationship.

Alexei Arbatov (Carnegie Moscow Center), Alexander Radchuk (Russian Ministry of Defense), and Anatoly Diakov (Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology) offered commentaries on Ambassador Brooks’ remarks. Rose Gottemoeller, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, moderated the discussion.
 
Recommendations
Ambassador Brooks advocated a simple approach that prioritizes transparency, predictability, and the political value of a successful agreement. The concerns of each side must be provided for; in general, Russia prizes predictability, while the United States seeks to preserve the ability to react to unforeseen international developments.

The two countries should negotiate one treaty to replace START and the 2002 Treaty of Moscow. This treaty must:

• Reduce the number of operationally deployed warheads below the limit set by the 2002 Treaty of Moscow.
• Limit launchers to a number slightly above current levels. Both launcher and warhead limits should be met no later than 2011, to ensure transparency and decrease mutual suspicion quickly.
• Allow adjustments to limits with five or more years’ notice, to ensure flexibility.
• Preserve a simplified version of the START inspection regime. Unnecessary verification measures should be eliminated to reduce cost.

Potential Pitfalls
The primary danger in the replacement process will be the temptation to expand the scope of the new treaty to cover missile defense, conventional forces, and other issues outside the purview of START. Ambassador Brooks urged both countries to resist the temptation to turn the replacement talks into negotiations on every contentious issue in U.S.-Russian relations.

Another potential pitfall will be the desire to alter technical language in the original treaty. Policymakers must bear in mind the broader goals of improving bilateral relations and preserving the strategic nuclear framework to avoid getting bogged down by minor adjustments to a treaty that has functioned well for fifteen years.

Arms Control and U.S.-Russian Relations
Panelists questioned whether the current period of tension over the conflict in Georgia would hamper re-negotiation efforts. While acknowledging the seriousness of the situation, Ambassador Brooks noted that the United States and Russia have worked productively on arms control in the past during politically tense phases. The most important concern, he said, was that the two countries remain in the habit of listening to each other, so geopolitical ups and downs do not threaten the bilateral nuclear relationship.

Introduction, commentary, and questions in Russian; main presentation and answers in English.