Russian Foreign Policy: A New Stage of Development

Russian foreign policy is now entering a fourth stage. The first three were associated with Foreign Minister Kozyrev, Foreign Minister Primakov, and Putin during his first term. In the first two stages Russia's foreign policy was reactive. In the third Russian foreign policy became more active. Now Putin faces a choice between realpolitik and post-World War II international security cooperation.

On November 2, 2005, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace hosted a meeting entitled “Russian Foreign Policy: A New Stage of Development” with Konstantin Kosachev, Chairman of the Committee on International Affairs, State Duma of the Russian Federation. Anders Aslund, Director of the Carnegie Russian and Eurasian Program, chaired the session. Kosachev’s remarks are summarized below.

Russian foreign policy is now entering a fourth stage. The first three were associated with Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov, and President Vladimir Putin during his first term, respectively. In the first two stages Russia was weak and its foreign policy reactive. In the third Russian foreign policy became more active as the country strengthened its political will and developed the energy sector. Now Putin faces a choice between realpolitik, in which might is right, and the post-World War II structures of international security cooperation.

So far Putin has chosen cooperation within international frameworks. But the results of this policy have been few and not obvious to ordinary Russians, for whom the 1990s were very disappointing. The logic of NATO expansion is not clear to Russians. There is now undesirable competition in the post-Soviet space.

No one should be worried about Russian foreign policy. Russia cooperates on security in the Middle East, the Balkans, and in North Korea. It also aids the struggle against terrorism and proliferation. Russian policy on Syria and Iran is not responsible for the problems there. The new leader of Iran definitely presents a problem—Russia condemned President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s recent statements about Israel and the United States. Russia and the US share the same assessment and goals with respect to Iran. Since the beginning of this year Iran has not been an issue in Russia-US relations.

Russia’s first foreign policy priority is the post-Soviet area, excluding perhaps the Baltic states. Russia once assumed the post-Soviet states would remain friendly because of shared history, but this was a mistake. These countries should be integrated into the EU and NATO. Membership in these organizations can unite a nation around a common project, making it stronger. Post-Soviet countries also need financial assistance. Russia can’t provide these things. But it can provide a market for goods produced in post-Soviet states, access to the Russian labor market, and subsidized oil and gas. The Baltic countries are making a mistake with their anti-Russian policy, but Russia is not attempting to sanction them. In pursuing projects like the North-European Gas Pipeline, Russia is protecting its national interest without breaking the rules.

Russia’s second priority is Europe. Here there is a concrete agenda for cooperation. This is in contrast to relations with the US. Russia and the US always talk about third parties, like North Korea. The visa agreement with the EU is a first and it shows Russia can be treated as a normal country. Russia will cooperate with Europe on a variety of matters, not just energy.

The third priority is Asia, particularly China, India, South Korea, and Japan. Increasingly Russian oil and gas will go to these countries. Currently they account for about three percent of exports, but that number should rise to fifteen or twenty percent within the next twenty years. Trade with these countries isn’t burdened by discussions of what’s happening inside Russia, as happens with the US.

There is a theory that Russia plays the US, the EU, and China against each other. This isn’t so. Russia is just very sensitive to how it is treated. Frankly the US is not a priority in Russian foreign policy. As for Russia’s future orientation, it depends on whether our foreign policy produces tangible results. Too often this is not understood abroad.

The 1990s discredited democracy and liberal economy in Russia. The West made a big mistake by not supporting Russia enough in this period. Democrats have at best ten to fifteen percent support in Russia and this is disappointing. Restoring belief in democracy will take time. Hopefully the West won’t make the same mistake again. Western countries should provide support along with criticism, or they make it difficult to keep Russia “on the democratic rails.”

Q&A

Q: How will Russian policy toward Georgia and Moldova evolve? Will Russia recognize Transdniestria and Abkhazia?
Kosachev: Russia receives frequent requests for recognition from the breakaways, but has chosen not to grant them. But there is no difference between Kosovo and Abkhazia. In both cases locals pushed out occupiers. Only the attitude of the US is different. Russia is not trying to take Abkhazia out of Georgia, but rather to protect the people who live there. Withdrawal from Trandniestria is impossible because of the ammo dumps there. Russia will get out when mutual confidence is restored.

Q: Should Russia engage the frozen conflicts under the G8? Pushkov suggested that if the US asks for independence for Kosovo, then Russia will ask the same for Abkhazia. What are your thoughts?
Kosachev: The G8 is not for conflict resolution. Here there is the danger of a chain reaction. As soon as you give independence to Kosovo, you can’t explain the other cases like Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia prefers to preserve territorial integrity.

Q: You said Russia made mistakes in the CIS. What were they? What lessons has Russia drawn from them?
Kosachev: Supporting one candidate in the Abkhaz election was a mistake. So was intervention in the Ukrainian election campaign, which only increased Yushchenko’s support. Russia also still supports any existing post-Soviet regime. The government talks about human rights in the Baltics, then says nothing about Belarus and Turkmenistan.

Q: Russia is not a priority for China and India. This presents a mismatch with Russian policy. How will you address it? Russia needs the US on investments like Shtokman and on the WTO. How will Russia deal with Western concerns about media freedom and judicial reform? Why is Western pressure “interference?” Isn’t such pressure a logical part of joining the G8 and the West generally?
Kosachev: Russia isn’t anybody’s foreign policy priority. It has no real allies and no real enemies. This will change when Russia becomes more attractive. The WTO is important, but its importance is often exaggerated. In 1995 American and European levels of investment in Russia were approximately equal at thirty percent of the total. But since then EU investment has risen to sixty-five percent while American investment has fallen to five percent. There are worrisome gaps in trade relations with the US: the 1992 investment protection treaty between the two countries, for example, has never been ratified. The Jackson-Vanick amendment is a continuing problem. The situation in Russia could be better on democracy, human rights, the judiciary, and the media. But Russia is not in a position to enjoy the full range of Western democracy. Twenty million Russians live in poverty. Repeating the experiment of the 90s now would only result in the victory of Rodina, the LDPR, or the Communists. When people’s daily problems are solved democracy can be restored.

Q: The idea of a chain reaction is false. The Velvet Divorce in Czechoslovakia and the Yugoslav breakup didn’t cause a chain reaction. The union of Serbia and Montenegro was the result of the very international system you praise. The Baltics are not as bad as the Russians say. Ethnic Russian parties in Estonia don’t even attain the threshold for parliamentary representation. The myth of the 90s you mention is an abdication of responsibility. Bringing Russia into the G8 was a big help and the US provided a lot of funding. Would you have preferred stronger intervention in the 90s to forestall the rise of the oligarchs? NATO enlargement happened because prospective member countries wanted it to.
Kosachev: The Velvet Divorce was different because there was agreement between the parties. Serbia and Montenegro are not ready to agree to independence for Kosovo. It would be a mistake for the West to do this without Belgrade. During the 90s the US could have kept countries out of NATO. There was no military reason to expand so quickly. G8 membership was the only positive result of fifteen years of cooperation and there is always the possibility Russia will be expelled.

Q: In four months there will be a new Ukrainian election. How will Russia approach it? What is the Russian approach to China—cooperation or rivalry?
Kosachev: Russia has no reason to interfere, though our government worries that other countries will. Poland doesn’t want Yanukovich. If others interfere, Russia will be forced to do something. The best situation is if the Ukrainians make their own choice. People in Russia are afraid of China. But Russia can’t solve its problems in the Far East without China. The border agreement was ratified in the spring. Russia must have good relations with China because it has no other choice.

Q: Ukrainian Prime Minister Yuriy Yekhanurov said if Russia gets into the WTO before Ukraine, then Ukraine will never be in the WTO. Is the opposite true?
Kosachev: During his visit to Moscow Yekhanurov agreed to synchronize WTO accession. If Ukraine accedes first there will be problems for Russia, and vice versa.