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Anders Åslund contrasted Russia's remarkable economic improvements with political repression and highlighted four crucial issues. First, the domestic implications of Russia's relations with the U.S. Second, the fact that U.S.-Russia diplomatic interaction is no longer dominated by transformation but by classical foreign policy. Third, Russia's potential for bilateral energy deals. And fourth, the future of Russia's trade policy, in particular the Jackson-Vanik amendment and Russia's accession to the WTO.
Lilia Shevtsova focused on President Putin's expectations of the summit. Today, Russians have more realistic views of the U.S.-Russia relationship as they better understand its limits and constraints. Russians no longer tussle over the Jackson-Vanik amendment, realizing it is mostly symbolic. They do not expect the U.S. President George W. Bush to force Russia's admission into the WTO, to order the Paris Group to forgive the country's debt, or to push U.S. private business to invest in Russia. Moreover, Russian intellectual and political classes have a rather ambivalent attitude about the U.S.-Russia energy partnership, as they question the possibility of Russia becoming a resource country, a safety wall between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia.
Shevtsova found reasons for optimism, however, particularly with regards to people's expectations of Russia's role in the international arena. Indeed, Russians hope that President Putin could serve as a geopolitical bridge-maker between President Bush and his counterparts in several instances, including the Iraqi reconstruction issue, Iran's nuclear ambitions, and the current crisis in North Korea. In addition, she observed, the great majority of the Russian population finds common interests with American people, and about 68% of Russians see the U.S. as a benevolent country. There are two specific issues that Russians hope can be solved at the U.S.-Russia summit, namely, disagreements concerning the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Agreement and the chronic visa problem.
Shevtsova also noted that the summit will be a central topic in the upcoming electoral campaign, as the two main political groups, the pragmatic, pro-American Yeltsinites and the conservative power ministries struggle to shape key issues on President Putin's international agenda. President Putin understands that the country needs to find its identity in the international community taking into account the Russian-U.S. relationship. However, as Shevtsova mentioned, he lacks a strategic approach, mainly because his political support base is fragmented. She predicted that, given the divergent views between modernizers and conservatives in the Kremlin, President Putin will adopt a combination of confrontational and ambivalent attitudes towards the meeting.
Finally, Shevtsova observed that whether or not the Russian leader embraces a clear agenda towards a sustainable and durable partnership with the U.S. during his second term in office depends upon two variables: President Putin's choice between the roles of domestic stabilizer and modernizer, and his selection of the oligarchs or the power ministries as basis of political support.
Anatol Lieven described today's diplomatic environment as characterized by unprecedented international fluidity, in which terms like partnership and alliance no longer convey a fixed and permanent relationship. Furthermore, talks about a definitive pro-American or pro-Western choice are not viable because even the idea of 'the West' as a strategic concept is currently a rather ambivalent notion. Lieven used U.S.-Turkey relations in the run-up to the Iraqi war as an example of a solid partnership that no longer holds, in part because of the U.S. failure to properly address the firmly held beliefs of Turkish political and military elite and public opinion. He pointed out that U.S.-Russia relations have experienced a parallel shift towards more pragmatic interactions.
Underneath this pragmatism, Lieven discerns a deep and solid foundation that unifies the two countries' national interests: namely, the war against terrorism. Nevertheless, he noted that this foundation is not sufficient to hold what he called "the baroque architectural fantasia" that the Bush administration has been trying to build. Favored by the current international diplomatic context, Russia has chosen to follow the European opposition front, while simultaneously positioning itself so as to maximize its influence in the international stage and to increase President Putin's domestic prestige.
No longer can a country assume, Lieven observed, that its behavior will not affect its foreign relations or have no significant repercussions in the governments and public opinion of the rest of the international community. The U.S. decision not to sign the International Criminal Court accord and its withdrawal from the Kioto Treaty have not determined the fate of U.S.-Russian relations. However, the cumulative effect of these resolutions and other aspects of the U.S. foreign policy in the last few months have not left a legacy in the Russian political elite and public opinion from which the U.S. administration can draw support for future endeavors.
On the Chechen issue, Lieven noted that U.S. experiences in Iraq will most likely reduce some of the criticism of the Russian army. However, he stated that it is in the U.S. interests to find a solution to this crisis because of the Islamic extremism it promotes and its destabilizing effect on the region. While he envisioned an international mandate supported by a peacekeeping mission as the only path towards a lasting solution, he regretted that the possibilities of such a resolution in the near term are close to none.
Ed Chow talked about the significance of the U.S.-Russia energy dialog and the expectations that either administration has of the summit: namely, the announcement of an investment deal or ambitious structural reforms. The dynamics affecting each country's objectives are very different. The U.S., as the world's main importer of crude oil, is interested in acquiring oil from a variety of countries, including Russia. But Russia, as a large oil and gas producer, needs to decide whether it wants to base its economy on commodity export or on a more diversified economic portfolio.
Chow agreed that the presence of foreign investment might certainly encourage a more extensive development of property rights in Russia. However, decisive governmental action is needed, particularly given that foreign firms interested in Russian oil and gas industries can only enter the market by establishing partnerships with local producers. He asserted that the presence of these domestic natural monopolies, whose interest is not volume but controlled production, prevents throughout economic and legal restructuring, more transparent access to capacity, and regulated rate of return. Thus, a promising investment project could face numerous legal barriers that might hamper its overall positive economic effect. It is time, Chow argued, to specify the U.S. administration's goals for the energy dialog and the extent to which it is willing to push President Putin towards greater reforms, given Russia's uncertain domestic political situation.
During the Q-and-A session, Shevtsova indicated that the significance of the summit for President Bush is noticeably greater than for the Russian President because the credibility and chances for re-election of the U.S. leader greatly depend on the evolution of the Iraq reconstruction and its international implications. Lieven added that the U.S. recognize the crucial role that Russia could play in the ratification of a new UN Security Council resolution on Iraq's reconstruction and as a viable channel between U.S. and Iranian officials regarding the latter's nuclear program.
Chow addressed concerns over the effects that diverging interests in oil and gas industries in Georgia could have on U.S.-Russia relations, reiterating that, instead of designing individual grand investment projects, the U.S. should focus on encouraging structural reforms. He mentioned that disagreements over the Bakuceyhan and Odessa-Brody issues are just two examples of how governments might advance investment deals without understanding the internal systemic dynamics of the energy market in the host country.
Lieven explored the nature of current U.S. policy towards Belarus. He asserted that, given the range of pressing issues in the U.S. foreign policy agenda, any significant changes in the bilateral relations would come as a result of internal developments in Belarus. Shevtsova and Åslund concurred that Russia might encourage modernization and restructuring of the Lukashenko's regime while simultaneously collaborating with leaders of the Belarusian opposition.
Åslund also discussed how recent events at the WTO ministerial meeting in Cancun might affect Russia's hopes of joining the trade organization. He argued in favor of those developing countries that have come together to address unresolved issues on protectionist practices in agriculture, and he emphasized that the WTO would provide the functional arbitration and managerial mechanism that CIS countries need.
Chow talked about the possibilities of U.S. and international energy industries influencing the Iranian issue. While the Iranian human capital and structural framework parallels that of the U.S. and British industries, he observed that the political obstacles in the U.S. might be too great for industries to attempt any significant involvement.
Shevtsova concluded the discussion, reiterating that Russia could play a significant role in the international arena only after the Russian political and leadership elite specifies the country's national interests and its international agenda.
Summary prepared by Silvia Manzanero, Junior Fellow with the Russian and Eurasian Program at the Carnegie Endowment.
