What Future for Political Reform in Iran?

Speakers:

Shaul Bakhash: Clarence J. Robinson Professor of History, George Mason University

Nasser Hadian: Visiting Scholar, Middle East Institute, Columbia University

Daniel Brumberg: Visiting Scholar, Carnegie Endowment

Moderator:

Thomas Carothers: Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment

This panel focused on the course and prospects of political reform and liberalization in Iran. Participants were invited to analyze the differences between reform and conservative elements of the Iranian government, the likely future of the reform movement, the new Bush administration line on Iran, and the likely impact of an invasion of Iraq on political reform in Iran. Thomas Carothers opened the panel by noting that President Bush surprised many people with his July 12th, 2002 declaration expressing solidarity with the Iranian people's aspiractions for freedom and the implicit signal that the administration was putting less credence than before on the importance of the reformists in Iran.

Mr. Bakhash's Comments

There are real differences between conservative and reformist elements in the Iranian government, manifested in very substantial divergence of these groups' policy stances regarding dialogue with the United States, Iran's posture towards Israel, initial views regarding U.S. military action in Afghanistan, and especially on all the issues that relate to Iranian internal governance, for example rights and freedoms, transparency, accountability, independence of the judiciary, and power of the elected branch. However, it is also clear that the reform movement has accomplished less than was originally hoped; setbacks for the reformers have included crackdowns by conservative elements and blocked legislation. The institutional balance of power has also shifted significantly towards the power of the supreme leader and the judiciary. It is also true though that Iranian society is freer and external relationships are better since 1996. The setbacks result from a power structure weighted towards the conservatives, reformist leaders' weakness, reformist reluctance to mobilize popular opinion, the absence of a mass political party and the success of the conservatives in portraying dissent as a challenge to the entire state.

There are three possible futures for Iran's reform movement. The first is continued stalemate between reformists and conservatives. The second is a harsher conservative crackdown, which is likely only in the case of widespread civil unrest or a new, serious challenge to conservative power. The third possibility is a new confrontation between reform and conservative elements, leading to a break in the stalemate. Such a confrontation may result from recent parliamentary legislation enhancing the power of the president, which the Council of Guardians will almost certainly block.

Recent U.S. policy towards Iran is unclear. The administration's idea that it should support the Iranian people's desire for freedom rather than engage the Iranian government seems to reflect noble sentiments more than a well-thought out policy. Disillusion with the reformists is high in Iran, but sustained internal protests and dissent require internal planning and leadership. There is little indication that the regime is about to collapse. Also, many of the active reformers are in the Iranian government and parliament, the reformist press is allied with the Khatami government, and there are political parties, institutions, and organizations which the U.S. must engage to concretely promote liberalization. On the subject of a U.S. military intervention in Iraq, the Iranian government has decided it can do little to effect U.S. policy and has, therefore, adopted a policy of "active neutralism." Iran will be affected if the Iraqi campaign goes very well or very poorly, but if the results are mixed and unclear the impact on Iranian political reform will be limited.

Mr. Nasser's Comments

Iran's government would most prefer the continuation of the status quo in Iraq because the United States has contained Saddam Hussein while, at the same time, Iraq keeps U.S. attention occupied and, therefore, away from Iran. There are four competing views on what Iran should do if a military campaign ensues in Iraq:

· The first view, which is that of the conservatives, is that Iran should adopt a policy similar to what it did in the Persian Gulf War or during the U.S.-led ouster of the Taliban in Afghanistan: condemning military intervention, calling on Iraq to allow weapons inspections, and providing limited help to the U.S. military by, for example, rescuing downed pilots or lifting the ban on Iraqi opposition operating out of Iran. After the war Iran would push for recognition of Shiite rights, a friendly government in Baghdad, and some role in reconstructing Iraq.
· The second viewpoint, found in the foreign ministry and Executive for Construction, holds that Iran should adapt its Afghanistan strategy in order to concessions such as changes in economic policies.
· The third perspective, primarily that of the reformers, is that the Iraqi campaign can be used as an excuse to address all the issues of concern between Iran and the United States. The most important Iranian concern is combating ideologically-motivated terrorism and Islamic radicalism, which are both on the rise in the Middle East, and which Iran is in a unique position to combat because the reform movement is itself a challenge to such ideologies.
· The fourth view is the radical view that holds that "Iran is next." The United States will engulf Iraq and then take on Iran and, therefore, Iran should get closer to Iraq, Russia, and China and counter its interests in Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Lebanon. Radical reformers and conservatives and parts of the armed forces support this view. However, the reality is that the first view will remain dominant in Iran's foreign policy stance.

In regards to the domestic situation in Iran, the reform movement is not over; it is has three possible futures: the status quo, a democratic and a non-democratic alternative. The democratic alternative will come about only if Khatami begins to act as a leader of the reform movement rather than simply its spokesman and a passive recipient of conservative initiatives. If Khatami were to exercise more leadership he would likely succeed in negotiating with the conservatives because democracy is a possible solution to the tension that results from the fact that the reformers controlled the elected government and popular support while the conservatives control the coercive forces and significant economic resources. The element of uncertainty surrounding the role of the coercive forces and of popular movements especially spurs the two sides to negotiate. The nondemocratic alternative would require one group to eliminate all the others and unify the polity. The only group which cannot be eliminated from Iran is the traditional right-wing conservatives (not the Islamic radicals); this group might be able to co-opt the other groups or force them out and unify the nation. In that case, their legitimacy would rest on their ability to create an efficient government, which would mean they would likely appoint secularists to their cabinet, solve their dilemmas with the United States, and expand social and economic freedoms while limiting political freedoms. The status quo is not a likely possibility.

Mr. Brumberg's Comments

If the illuminating comments provided to us by Professors Bakhash and Nasser remind us of anything, it is that the complex struggle between reformists, conservatives, and hard-liners in Iran does matter, and that any effective American foreign policy must take this struggle into account. The Bush administration's policy reflects a confusion between what we want and the way the world actually is, between prescription and analysis, between ideology and facts. What we all want is for Iran to abandon policies that run counter to our interests, and thus some of us imagine that a regime change in Tehran is around the corner. But this is very unlikely. The current power struggle in Iran may lead in any one of several directions, but the most likelihood long term outcome is a slow, uneasy political liberalization that allows for a measure of greater openness but without undermining the fundamental ruling institutions of the Islamic Republic. Such an outcome would depend on a political pact between pragmatic conservatives and opposition moderates, something that is not easy to achieve but not inconceivable. It would depend not merely on President Khatami becoming bolder and more decisive, but also on the readiness of Supreme Leader Khamanei to play the role of arbiter rather than the defender of the interests of one faction. From Washington's perspective, such a slow, negotiated pact, one that "reforms" the system without removing it, may be too slow and too messy. But like it or not, in the short and medium term, we will have to try to influence Iran's foreign policy in the context of an ambiguous "transition" that allows for the uneasy coexistence of democratic forces and a clerical establishment that remains deeply suspicious of democracy. I doubt that a successful, American-led campaign to topple Saddam Hussein and establishment a working democracy will decisively change the logic of Iranian politics. It may, if we play our cards right, strengthen the reformists, but it could just as easily backfire and strengthen the hard-liners. But we should not exaggerate the potential "demonstration effect" that events in Iraq may have in Iran or the wider Middle East. With the exception of the Palestine issue, politics in the Arab world is largely a local affair, dictated by local, social, cultural and political realities, all of which have been remarkably kind to the liberalized autocracies of the region.

Synopsis prepared by Bethany Lacina, Junior Fellow with the Democracy and Rule of Law Project at the Carnegie Endowment.