Minna Ålander
Research fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs
No, it is necessary. Russia’s war in Ukraine the past two and a half years has made it painfully clear that European countries’ responses to this challenge has been inadequate. Europe lacks a coherent defense industrial base, which both reduces production capacity and makes it inefficient. The problems begin with lack of standardization: multiple versions of the same weapons systems exist, as each European country insists on its specific needs. The EU is well suited to (try to) address these questions, even if national caveats inevitably remain in place.
Focusing the portfolio of the commissioner for defense and space on defense-related matters outside of defense planning, which is a clear NATO competency, is also smart. The EU has, in turn, the right regulatory and budgetary competencies to address Europe-wide challenges such as military mobility and hybrid threats. Including space is necessary, as it is a field that particularly requires cooperation among European countries.
The point of creating this portfolio is not to make it a competition between the EU and NATO but rather to improve and streamline cooperation and division of labor between the organizations.
Additionally, Russia is not the only problem for European countries. The mounting challenges from China and in the Middle East require better cohesion in threat assessment.
Max Bergmann
Director of the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies
It’s not a mistake. It is an absolute necessity. There is a clear role for the EU in revamping Europe’s decrepit and fragmented defense industrial base and getting European militaries to buy the same equipment.
The war in Ukraine has shown how vital a thriving defense industrial base is to any war effort. The conflict has also shown how much of a strain it is to operate many different types of equipment. It's hard to deploy and fight together when everyone is using a different kit. NATO has utterly failed here and is hamstrung because of its small budget and the competition between U.S. and European defense firms.
The EU’s role is thus essential because the union could get access to a much larger pool of funding, whether through the EU budget or by potentially borrowing funds, which can be used to incentivize joint procurements. NATO officials need to get over their bureaucratic pettiness and encourage this effort.
Sophia Besch
Senior fellow in the Europe Program of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
There are many good reasons to be skeptical about the EU defense commissioner’s ability to deliver, chief among them his lack of resources and a lack of member states’ buy-in to the EU’s defense industrial plans. Since these have been discussed at length already, let me outline three perhaps slightly less obvious opportunities that come with the creation of this post.
First, it’s about having someone to call in Europe. In the United States, politics is about personnel. An EU “defense czar” who can engage partners on the EU’s defense industrial plans and cut through the noise of Permanent Structured Cooperation, the European Defence Fund, the European Peace Facility, the European Defence Industry Programme, and other initiatives would be helpful in Washington—as long as he is not undermined at every turn by national capitals.
Secondly, it’s about institutional memory. EU timelines are long. Even if the first defense commissioner does not make a big splash, this new post can create bureaucratic momentum and generate expertise, allowing for an expansion of European Commission’s competencies and resources later down the line.
Thirdly, it’s about NATO-EU coordination. Clearly, judging from NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg’s recent interview, all is not well in this relationship. High-level meetings between NATO and an EU defense point person could help figure out how exactly the EU’s defense industrial plans can slot into NATO defense planning processes.
Raluca Csernatoni
Fellow at Carnegie Europe
It is a bold step in response to the ongoing war in Ukraine, to confront complex threats and orchestrate a unified strategy instead of the twenty-seven member states’ fragmented defense policies.
But the title “commissioner for defense” and the vague scope of responsibilities risk further ruffling feathers in capitals, who are guarding their sovereign prerogatives. It could also lead to more institutional infighting over competencies. That is why a more nuanced title like “defense industrial strategy commissioner” could have better framed the role around defense industrial strategy, and avoided tensions over national autonomy while prioritizing the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base. Just as the EU has harmonized other critical policies for mutual benefit, a unified defense industrial strategy would bolster the union’s ability to protect its citizens and enhance their sense of security.
Collective security strengthens all EU member states and bolsters the European pillar within NATO. The EU’s defense policy remains a patchwork riddled with gaps and inconsistencies. In this respect, the new commissioner will face gargantuan tasks: rallying political support for more EU involvement in defense; streamlining and delivering on existing initiatives; allocating sufficient resources to incentivize joint development, production, and procurement; and convincing governments of the benefits of deeper defense market integration.
Camille Grand
Distinguished policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations
The EU is becoming a real player in the field of defense, so appointing a dedicated commissioner leading this effort on defense industry and technology is a welcome and logical step in times of war in Europe and uncertain future for the transatlantic security relationship. To succeed, Andrius Kubilius will nevertheless have to overcome several challenges as defense is not a well-established European Commission domain, or one that can become overnight part of the acquis using the commission’s regulatory powers.
First, EU member states and NATO play and will continue to play a central role in shaping defense policies across Europe. The defense commissioner will have to navigate a new field for the European Commission, accept to be the new kid on the block, and engage outside the commission’s comfort zone in a deeply intergovernmental domain.
Second, money matters. The commission will not shape the defense of Europe or even European defense industry by spending less than 1 percent of European defense spending as under the current multiannual financial framework.
Third, the level of ambition of the new commission will be immediately tested on assistance to Ukraine and through the proposed white paper. This requires hitting the ground running.
Liana Fix
Fellow for European at the Council on Foreign Relations
A European commissioner for defense is long overdue. This position does not mean that the EU will try to duplicate NATO, or that it will have a European army anytime soon. But Russia’s war against Ukraine has demonstrated what a woeful state the European defense industry is in. And not only for Ukraine—for Europe's own security, better coordination between the EU and NATO is urgently needed.
The EU should become the financing arm of European security, investing in the bloc’s scattered landscape of defense companies, and coordinate procurement across the continent. Just as the Ramstein format and the capability coalitions are coordinating support for Ukraine, so should NATO and the EU work together to ensure efficiency and effectiveness.
The times of a normative or geoeconomic power Europe are over. Europe needs to become a security actor in those areas where it can make a useful contribution. Supporting Europe’s defense industry, procurement, and research is such an area. It’s the minimum the EU should deliver—in support of, not against or in competition with, NATO.
Linas Kojala
Director of the East Europe Studies Centre in Vilnius
The commissioner for defense will face plenty of challenges. For example, in 2022, joint defense spending on acquisitions by EU members was only 18 percent, highlighting the inefficiency of limited resources.
The selection of a Lithuanian politician for this position is significant. Andrius Kubilius is a strong supporter of NATO and transatlantic cooperation, which suggests he will address NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg's concerns about the risk of duplicating efforts. Instead of pushing for overly ambitious ideas like a unified EU military—popular a few years ago—Kubilius will likely focus on practical, incremental progress that complements NATO’s initiatives.
As the first defense commissioner, Kubilius will also need to define the role and set important precedents. I believe he will play a key and visible role in shaping the narrative around the EU’s role in defense, emphasizing EU-NATO cooperation rather than competition. While member states will remain the primary decisionmakers on defense and procurement, the EU has an opportunity to leverage its single market and investment capacities—areas where NATO does not have competencies.
Nicole Koenig
Head of policy at the Munich Security Conference
The creation of the European commissioner for defence and space is a timely and strategic move. In the context of Russia’s war on Ukraine, it provides a crucial focal point for aligning EU defense initiatives with NATO’s priorities. The role is not about competing with the Alliance, but about enhancing Europe’s defense industrial capacity, fostering cooperation, and boosting interoperability in line with NATO standards.
The new commissioner’s primary task will be to oversee the implementation of the European Defence Industrial Strategy, which seeks to promote collaborative defense projects, incentivize joint procurement, and facilitate the ramping up of production. If properly executed, this could strengthen the European pillar within NATO while reducing costly duplication and fragmentation.
Three factors will be key for the new commissioner to succeed. First, member states must fully commit to the European Defence Industrial Strategy and agree on large-scale defense projects of common interest. Second, adequate funding is essential, both in the short term and through the EU’s next multiannual financial framework. Third, the new commissioner must closely cooperate with the EU high representative for foreign affairs and security policy to ensure coherence and prevent infighting. In today’s security environment, the EU cannot afford internal misalignment on defense matters.
Olivier Schmitt
Professor at the University of Southern Denmark’s Center for War Studies
NATO, whose organizing principle is to facilitate the coordination of the member states’ defense apparatus, relies on these member states’ goodwill to meet the targets set by the Defence Planning Process. This creates a collective action problem since member states have an incentive to simply free-ride. This particular problem has vexed U.S. administrations, with consequences for collective defense planning. During the Cold War, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) directed NATO countries to maintain sixty-day reserves of spare parts and ammunition, but the instructions were never implemented, and the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) had no authority to enforce them.
A classic solution to a collective action problem is public regulation. NATO has no legal basis for establishing one, but the European Commission can, since it is both the executive arm of the EU and the sole holder of the right of legislative initiative within the union. When the commissioner for defense calls for stockpiles of ammunitions, he will likely have the legal capability to enforce such calls. Nobody serious is arguing that the EU should duplicate NATO military structures. Instead, if properly coordinated with NATO, the EU can help solve the alliance’s collective action problem for the vast majority of its European members, and both sides of the Atlantic will be better for it.
Aleksandra Kozioł
Senior analyst at the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)
It is by no means a mistake but rather a timely step that can facilitate decisive action. Ultimately, the success of the EU as a security actor depends on the joint commitment of the European Commission and the member states—a commitment that has only been in place since February 2022. Despite the need for sustained investment in defense over decades, any attempt to do so earlier would have been futile without a conducive political environment. In this sense, the creation of the defense commissioner’s post now represents a symbolic change within the EU, all the more so as space is underestimated as one of the most promising sectors of the future.
Nor is this decision an overreach. The proposed portfolio is well in line with the EU’s treaties. It shows that in times of crisis, the commission puts forward concrete proposals to address current challenges and helps to build consensus among member states. The focus on defense industrial development, joint initiatives with economies of scale, and space security has the potential to facilitate the resolution of some of the most pressing issues. This, in turn, will allow not only for increased military support to Ukraine, but also for ensuring our own security in the face of growing global competition.
Federica Mangiameli
Senior program manager for security and defense at GLOBSEC
The appointment of an European commissioner for defense and space marks a positive step toward the creation of a European Defence Union. However, questions remain regarding the commissioner’s responsibilities, especially in relation to the high representative for foreign affairs and security policy or the commissioner for the single market’s portfolio.
Broadly speaking, the new commissioner should focus on rebuilding the EU’s industrial base—an effort that, if coordinated with NATO, could significantly enhance production capacity and benefit the alliance in these turbulent times.
In my opinion, the real dilemma remains structuring EU-NATO cooperation. While collective defense is primarily NATO’s responsibility, closer synergies with the EU could prove highly beneficial. It may be time to recalibrate the division of labor, developing a coherent plan where the EU jointly works with NATO in key areas such as standardisation, military logistics, and the scaling up of production without creating competition or unnecessary duplication.
Ultimately, it’s a matter of perspective. The challenges ahead demand vision, clarity, and efficient processes, with a focus on opportunities rather than potential competition. I would interpret NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg’s recent remarks as an invitation to sit down and discuss the way forward—something an Atlanticist like Mr. Kubilius understands well.
