Tony Barber
Europe editor at Financial Times
Yes, but not because of the composition of the new European Parliament.
The balance of forces in the legislature remains weighted in favor of party groups that want to press on with the EU’s agenda. It should be possible to fill the EU’s top leadership positions without too much trouble.
The bigger problem is the heavy blow which the election results delivered to the already weakened political authority of President Emmanuel Macron in France and the three parties in Germany’s ruling coalition. Franco-German cooperation on the EU’s agenda was in difficulty even before the elections.
Now it will be harder to push ahead on areas of the EU’s agenda where the tough decisions are made not by the Parliament but by the European Council, and where the leaderships of France and Germany in particular need to set the pace.
One area of concern will be the search for a consensus on where to find the very large sums of money needed to invest in defense, economic rejuvenation, business competitiveness, and climate-change policies. Another area will be the EU’s proposed enlargement to the east.
Success for Macron in his snap election gamble would improve the outlook, but the overall challenges facing the EU’s agenda will remain formidable.
Thorsten Benner
Director of the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi)
It is the European Parliament elections’ fallout in the EU’s two biggest member states that poses the most serious challenges for an adequate agenda on European security in the face of Moscow’s aggression underwritten by Beijing.
In Germany’s east, pro-Kremlin parties have the support of almost half of all voters. The country’s east will have three state elections in the fall, putting stronger support for Ukraine under pressure in both the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) that will seek to avoid bleeding more voters to both extreme-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the leftist-nationalist Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW).
All the while, a thoroughly weakened coalition government will struggle to put together a budget, let alone agree on an ambitious joint European financing mechanism for defense spending.
The situation is even worse in France where Macron is betting the house with his decision to call a snap parliamentary election. In a parliament with the far-right Rassemblement National (RN) as the strongest party, let alone a RN-run government, Macron will struggle to mobilize the necessary funding for supporting Ukraine or getting a joint EU funding mechanism ratified.
Germany and France risk being the Europe’s weakest links in the fall, just when the EU needs to be ready to confront a possible Trump return.
Olivier de France
Lecturer in politics at the University of Oxford’s Pembroke College
The EU’s political agenda is certainly in jeopardy. Less so, perhaps, because of the coming composition of the European Parliament per se than the ongoing political battle being waged outside of Brussels.
Ironically enough, it so happens that the term jeopardy itself comes from the early medieval French word jeu-parti: it describes a game in which participants have an even chance of winning or losing, which spawned an entire genre of poetic sparring designed by troubadours to implore for love. Emmanuel Macron’s gamble to call a snap parliamentary election has thrown France, and by extension Europe, into a high-stakes political game that neither is certain of winning.
The outcome on July 7 next will show whether the French president has managed to call forth the love or hate of his electorate. Combined with the latest domestic political developments across the continent, the results will color the European atmosphere for the next five years. By extension, they will affect how much leeway the European Commission is afforded on issues from Ukraine to the Green Deal—far more so, no doubt, than the coalitions of the incoming European Parliament.
Ken Godfrey
Executive director of the European Partnership for Democracy
Generally, we can split the future into four quadrants: macro versus micro and internal versus external. At the macro level we are likely to see the center hold, probably with a coalition of the European People’s Party (EPP), Socialists and Democrats (S&D), Renew, and the Greens to get the votes needed for the European Commission president in the European Parliament. This will set the overall Commission agenda.
But at the micro level, there will be significant changes in how parliamentary committees operate and the alliances to get legislation through. The EPP will be tempted to work more with parties that have similar policy priorities to their right. How far this cooperation extends will have a major bearing on the substance of the EU’s agenda.
On foreign policy, there are unlikely to be any fundamental changes given the fact that the EPP seeks a “pro-European, pro-Ukraine” alliance.
But on internal policies, the coalition will be put to the test, particularly on taking the Green Deal forward, where the EPP will feel vindicated in challenging the von der Leyen Commission’s agenda in the last year. This highlights the key irony of the elections—the power dynamics mean the EPP will formally cooperate with parties to its left while the political agenda is shifting to its right.
Giovanni Grevi
Senior fellow at the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy of the Brussels School of Governance (VUB)
A credible EU agenda requires joint leadership, but the recent EU ballot risks delivering a leaderless Europe. The reason is that the European vote has affected Europe’s political physics—the forces at play and their direction—more than its political arithmetic—electoral shares. The nationalist surge has been significant but uneven and, on a continental scale, not overwhelming. Far-right parties hold less than a quarter of the European Parliament’s seats, and they are divided. The European elections, however, have affected Europe’s political physics in three ways.
First, the gravitational pull of far-right narratives continues to intensify, often setting the agenda that others need to respond to.
Second, the accumulation of the nationalists’ political energy in pivotal countries like France and Germany can trigger chain reactions, depending on the outcome of the upcoming vote in France.
Third, the elections’ result altered the distribution of the political mass in Europe, with Berlin and Paris losing weight due to their polarized and volatile domestic politics. To counter the surge of far-right nationalism, pro-European forces must pool their energy and outline an ambitious agenda of investment in Europe’s shared future. Unchecked, the forces of nationalism will only grow stronger.
Daniel Hegedüs
Senior fellow at The German Marshall Fund of the United States
The EU agenda will certainly be put to the test in the new European Parliament, but it may be too early to bury it. However, the rightward, conservative shift in the composition of the new parliament will certainly have an uneven impact on different policy areas.
In those pioneered by the Greens and the liberal Renew, such as the Green Deal and the protection of the rule of law, the level of ambition will certainly drop. On geopolitical and security issues, competitiveness, trade and technology, there is a good chance that the EU’s policy direction will be maintained and dominated by a rational consensus carried by the political center of the parliament.
The rallying around the flag of the political center will certainly be facilitated by the shock of the French snap election and the possible destabilizing effect of Rassemblement National entering the government. That shock may also help to find majorities behind the reelection of Ursula von der Leyen for a second term at the helm of the European Commission.
In terms of numbers, the political center has a clear majority in the European Parliament. The rise of the far right in large member states such as France and Germany has a destabilizing effect on European politics, but the radical right has not made a breakthrough in the parliament. In this context, stability will be a highly sought-after political commodity in the EU. The desire for it could once again bring the EPP, S&D, and Renew together in close cooperation and limit the EPP’s flirtation with the radical right. The vote on von der Leyen will be the first indication of whether this will happen.
Linas Kojala
Director of the Eastern Europe Studies Center, Vilnius
The list of EU concerns is growing, and the union must address some of its structural shortcomings, irrespective of political cycles.
For instance, in 2023, EU commitments were set at €186.6 billion ($201.8 billion). This is a tiny amount for dealing with climate change, wars, geopolitical tensions, the cost-of-living crisis, and numerous other challenges. Moreover, proposals such as a portfolio on defense in the next Commission are welcome but vague, given the limited resources in a policy area that remains mostly under national competence.
The EU has made significant strides in recent years, including setting up an unprecedented pandemic recovery fund. Yet, with so many issues at stake, there is a risk of overpromising and underdelivering. If the gap between ambitious rhetoric and on-the-ground realities remains too wide, disappointment may prevail. That, in turn, could strengthen radical political parties even more.
The EU is not in jeopardy; it continues to function as usual, muddling through the difficulties. However, to address the growing list of concerns, it needs strong but clear-eyed political leadership; bold statements must be coupled with a well-thought-out plan for implementation. The new political leadership of the EU will have a short window of opportunity to achieve this.
Stefan Lehne
Senior fellow at Carnegie Europe
The outcome of the European Parliament elections does not in itself threaten the EU’s agenda.
It is true that the radical right has gained ground, but centrist parties have secured a clear majority. The future political orientation of the European Parliament will primarily be determined by the European People’s Party (EPP), which emerged strengthened from the elections and in the future can seek allies on the left and the right. EPP members are often tempted to imitate policies of populist-right parties in the belief that this could take the wind out of their sails. This strategy has often backfired in the past. But the climate and liberal values agenda of the parliament could suffer as a result.
The real shocker of the elections, however, was that they revealed the lack of popular support for the political leaders in France and Germany. President Macron responded to his party’s electoral fiasco by scheduling a snap parliamentary election, a high-stakes gamble that might well bring Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National into government.
The comparable defeat of the ruling parties in Germany will probably not have such dramatic consequences. Rather, it might further exacerbate friction and paralysis in the coalition. Whether through high drama in France or mutual blockage in Germany, the result could be the absence of effective leadership in both countries. And in the absence of such leadership, the EU will struggle to cope with the various geopolitical and economic challenges before it.
Linas Linkevičius
Former foreign and defense minister of Lithuania
Honestly, it’s not just about the agenda. It’s about the EU itself. Time and current threats form the agenda. They do not wait for the relevant institutions to adapt, reform, and prepare in other ways.
After the elections, we see a bit of a shift in the political landscape. Radical forces raised their heads and declared their ambitions. It probably won’t have a fatal impact on the political landscape at the European level yet, but it certainly shook the major European economies in France and Germany.
People want more assertiveness and clear leadership. They want not only discussions but also solutions. At the moment, we are not able to form a unified policy or strategy on China. We were not able to formulate a consistent policy toward Russia in time. We were late with sanctions.
The constant trade-off between values and principles in search of compromise agreements undermine the EU’s authority and credibility. One country is constantly torpedoing all the essential decisions of the EU regarding support for Ukraine. We must finally use Article 7 of the EU treaty to strip Hungary’s voting rights. We have to apply Qualified Majority Voting on the most essential issues of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), such as sanctions, EU missions, enlargement.
The EU must reform decisively, otherwise it will lose not only the initiative but also relevance and leverages to react to these challenges.
Denis MacShane
Former UK Minister for Europe
No. Even if the EU disappeared tomorrow, each national government would be faced with the same problems the current EU agenda has to deal with.
Look at Brexit Britain. Under the current and the next—likely Labor—government, the issues of growth, investment, climate change, decarbonization, Ukraine, immigration, China, AI, and concern over a return of Donald Trump to the White House fill ministers’ in-trays.
Every EU leader of whatever political color, including Giorgia Meloni and Marine Le Pen, can see that Brexit has been a disaster for the UK and the ruling Conservative Party. Brexit has helped transfer power to a reformist social democratic government in a few weeks.
The European Parliament elections changed little. Contrary to the conventional wisdom of academics and pundits over the last decade of an unstoppable conquest of Europe by the far right with their hates of the EU, immigrants, gays in the case of Giorgia Meloni, or open invocation of the Third Reich by some prominent AfD leaders, the European Parliament elections showed voters staying with existing mainstream pro-EU parties.
The far right gained just nine seats out of 720. The EPP increased its share of MEPs and the democratic left remained stable.
The EU was constructed on possible realities, not fantasies of a monoethnic, single-religion nationalisms. Every crisis Europe faces needs more—not less—cooperation and common policy. That won’t change.
Pol Morillas
Director of the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB)
Yes, but not necessarily due to the results of the European Parliament elections. The extreme-right tide has had a big impact but has not swept away the new parliament.
The European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), Identity and Democracy (ID), and new far-right parties are increasingly influential, particularly in the founding EU member states and in the big ones. Only in Spain does the European center of popular and socialists resist the challenge of Euroskeptic far-right movements.
The balance in the next political cycle will thus be subject to the growing contestation of the extreme right and the fragility of the European political center, which, despite retaining the majority, fears political ups and downs in national governments.
In that sense, confrontation in the Council will be as important as polarization in the European Parliament. Take security and defense, the emerging new consensus in the upcoming cycle.
The EU agenda will be driven toward reindustrialization, increased defense spending, and hopefully robust advancements toward a geopolitical Europe, both in theory and practice.
But will such advancements be made on the basis of more EU integration or of more national protagonism? Will the EU opt for joint assistance schemes for Ukraine and more interoperability of its defense systems? Or will it rather understand defense as a member-state-based endeavor and a purely intergovernmental effort of coordination? Here is where a far-right-leaning Europe will have its enduring effect, especially in the Council.
Marc Pierini
Senior fellow at Carnegie Europe
Irrespective of the coalitions and arrangements between political groups, the work program of the new European Commission will inevitably be affected by the higher proportion of extreme-right deputies in the European Parliament.
The first challenge will be to accommodate the powerful message coming out of the ballot about migration. The Commission will be under strong pressure to drastically curtail irregular migration flows. This difficult debate will probably end up with more funding for arrangements with third countries.
Another major challenge will be the EU’s response to the Russian war against Ukraine. While humanitarian and economic support will probably continue, the EU funding of military assistance may be openly challenged, especially the supply of high-end weapons and aircraft, or troop secondment. Both the Council and the Commission will receive criticism from some political forces in the European Parliament.
Similarly, the current policy of resisting both Russia’s aggression on Ukraine and its multiple interferences with EU countries will likely be challenged in the name of peace by extreme right parties close to the Kremlin. Yet, whether the higher weight of these political forces will allow them to prevail over the European Council on such major issues remains to be seen.
Ultimately, the biggest challenge for the European Council—and therefore the Commission as well—will be the preservation of fundamental rights within the EU, should they come under direct attack from the new European Parliament.
Wojciech Przybylski
Editor in chief of Visegrad Insight, Warsaw
The new European Parliament’s composition is unlikely to challenge the EU strategic agenda. The mainstream majority is expected to advocate for a stronger, more democratic union.
But national politics, particularly in France, Austria, Germany, and other countries may disrupt major European initiatives. National strategies could delay or thwart the execution of critical priorities, such as increased support for Ukraine, new funding for defense, or EU enlargement.
Despite predictions to the contrary, mainstream parties maintained their advantage over the far right. The EPP gained ten additional seats compared to 2019, surpassing most forecasts. In fact, only Hungary’s Tisza party will soon add seven more seats to their score. Although Renew and the Greens lost most votes, they remain crucial to the new majority, especially during one of Europe’s most perilous periods since World War II.
Consequently, security will be central to the EU’s agenda, with anticipated full support from the European Parliament. The strategy for the next five years must be built on three pillars: foreign policy and enlargement, economic security with a revised green agenda, and democratic security, including disinformation resilience. Any diversion from these points will depend on the country leaders in the European Council, not the parliament.
That’s why the significant gains of the far right, challenging governments in Berlin, Paris, or Vienna, could not make Russia happier. The snap elections announced by Macron show that some of European top leaders think “party first, EU second.” It will take both guts and wits of uncontested leaders like Donald Tusk to navigate the European ship in such waters.
Sanna Salo
Postdoctoral fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs
From a purely democratic perspective, there should not be an EU agenda independent from the composition of its only directly elected organ, the European Parliament. In that sense, speaking of the election result jeopardizing the agenda is posing the question incorrectly. The agenda will—and ought to—change when its political underpinnings change.
Yet, continuity of governance is also a democratic virtue. From that perspective, the coming five years might bring disruptions. I doubt the incoming parliament’s composition will lead to dramatic changes in things that really matter, such as Ukraine, Russia, or even the climate. The center can still hold, although the pull to the right might change levels of ambition in, say, implementing the Green Deal and make majorities more volatile.
The more dramatic changes might come in the form of national governments composed of policymakers with far-right, authoritarian leanings in important member states such as France, if Macron’s gamble fails. That’s when, given unanimity requirements in important policy fields, the EU’s decisionmaking and thereby its agenda might really be in jeopardy.
Zsuzsanna Végh
Program officer at the German Marshall Fund of the United States
The European parliamentary elections served a blow to green and progressive forces and brought the rise of the far right—reflecting some of the shifts and discontent unfolding at the national level over the past years.
Yet, for now it seems it is still the center that has the best chance of forming a coalition to elect the next European Commission president, potentially landing a second term for Ursula von der Leyen. The demise of the Greens, nonetheless, foretells that the momentous push behind the green transition, which was the hallmark of the past five years, is coming to an end. This shift would also be welcomed by the far right, which has been pushing back against the green agenda.
Although a center-backed new Commission would suggest continuity in major geopolitical questions it would need to grapple with a far-right challenge that will fade neither at the national nor at the EU level—it may even intensify if President Macron’s gamble with an early election in France ushers in the National Rally and its emerging allies to government.
Thus, any attempt of deepening the integration, strengthening the competences of EU institutions, or ensuring the protection of EU values and principles will be confronted with objecting calls for a Europe of sovereign nation-states—now louder than ever.
.jpg)
.jpg)
