Alicja BachulskaPolicy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
As things stand in 2023, Europe’s primary strategic concerns revolve around Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its consequences for the continent. In this context, growing U.S.-China rivalry has evoked fear among many Europeans that Washington’s strategic rebalancing toward the Indo-Pacific might leave the EU more vulnerable to outside pressure, both military and economic.
Simultaneously, with China’s tacit approval of the Russian invasion and its continued efforts to legitimize Moscow’s perspective on the war, Europe seems increasingly disillusioned with Beijing’s allegedly constructive role on the international arena.
This realization should translate into more transatlantic cooperation to counter the threats arising from China’s revisionism, including in the context of its flourishing relationship with Russia. The EU, and especially its Central and Eastern European members, can offer a lot of insights in this domain.
China is currently pursuing a charm offensive toward Europe in the hope of restoring strained relations with the continent fraught by economic and energy crises. Beijing’s goal, however, is to distance the EU from the United States in order to prevent the forming of a more comprehensive transatlantic policy toward China.
If Europe wants to influence U.S.-China rivalry in any substantial way, it should not give into the temptation of returning to business as usual in its relations with Beijing.
Krzysztof BłędowskiVisiting adjunct professor at the Rzeszów University of Information Technology and Management
Of course it can.
The China-West contest echoes the Cold-War era antagonism between the Soviet Union and the West. In the previous struggle, ideology united the West on universal grounds of liberalism and capitalism. Europe had skin in this battle, so it joined forces with the United States on multiple fronts, including trade, human rights, defense, and ideology, among others.
To some in Europe today, China appears more distant than the Soviet Union did, primarily on account of geography, but also because communist ideology no longer poses a threat. On top of this, Europe’s relative weakness with regard to China—in tech or due to lack of internal unity—saps the resolve to face reality.
If China threatens the global commons of transparent markets, personal liberty, or national sovereignty, then Europe has skin in this game. It can influence the rivalry by joining forces with the advanced West of Canada, Australia, Korea, Japan, and others to coordinate trade regimes, cyber defenses, investment policies, and the place of human rights in economic relations.
The worst that Europe could do is to treat this as a bilateral U.S.-China conflict. Such a posture wasn’t viable during the Cold War. In the present struggle it would relegate the old continent to global irrelevance and embolden China to threaten it even more.
Lizza BomassiDeputy director of Carnegie Europe
Yes, but not alone and not all at once. And while the U.S.-China rivalry is as multi-faceted as it is complex, it is primarily playing out in the economic and security domains. The two are not mutually exclusive and there are certainly areas where even the United States and China recognize the need to cooperate and where full-out confrontation would be counterproductive and detrimental to their own interests.
The European tendency has so far been to hedge its bets depending on the issue it wants to toe the middle line on and whether it can get all European member states to agree on a clear course of action. That translates, in practice, into situations where sometimes China is the partner, and at other times, it’s the United States. Even though the expectation is to be as closely aligned with Washington given historical legacies and the compatibility of their values system, that is not always a given.
In the end, for Europe, it’s about balancing a transactionalist approach with a heavy dose of pragmatism and clearly prioritizing areas it will want to influence in its favor, such as economic stability or cybersecurity. All this while simultaneously identifying its most-likely allies and building alliances in a game of quid-pro-quo. No easy juggling act considering all the aspects that need to be taken into account.
Reinhard BütikoferForeign affairs coordinator of the Greens/European Free Alliance Group in the European Parliament
Europe must influence U.S.-China rivalry to give credibility to its claim of pursuing a values-based foreign policy, and to defend its own interests. The main point is about putting this rivalry into context. That would greatly benefit the development of international relations.
The U.S.-China rivalry is but one dimension of the challenges Beijing poses. China’s expansive totalitarianism is threatening democracies big and small. Its coercive behavior through military and economic means is affecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of countries even beyond its immediate neighborhood.
China pursues a revisionist policy, undermining important pillars of the rule-of-law-based international order. It wants to substitute multilateralism with a China-centric hub-and-spokes structure. Beijing is trying to alienate countries of the Global South from building solid relationships with Europe, the United States, Japan, and other like-minded states.
All these dimensions of the Chinese Communist Party’s pursuit of international dominance were reflected in what the EU meant when defining China as a systemic rival in 2019. Reducing the analysis of the conflict to the rivalry between two superpowers is in line with China’s propaganda. The collective West should know better and act—in multiple alliances—accordingly.
Alexander GabuevSenior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Europe can’t change the direction of U.S.-China rivalry. Problems between Washington and Beijing are structural and the confrontational trajectory is unlikely to change, unless one side—or both sides at the same time—makes a fundamental shift.
Still, Europe plays a major role in the Sino-American competition. The United States wants to enlist Europe as an ally and exercise policies to limit China’s technological potency jointly with allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Meanwhile, Beijing wants to prevent the formation of a transatlantic coalition that would limit China’s access to Western technology and markets.
Europe may be less hawkish on China than its American partners, and thus will have an internal discussion about the right balance of its values and interests when it comes to Beijing. What Europe shouldn’t do is believe that China’s involvement can be a silver bullet that can stop the war in Ukraine and restrain Vladimir Putin. President Xi Jinping’s leverage over the erratic leader in the Kremlin is growing but still limited, and China is not interested in a Ukrainian victory as defined by President Volodymyr Zelensky. Beijing is unlikely to exercise real pressure on Moscow even if the EU’s approach to China becomes friendlier.
Alicia García-HerreroSenior fellow at Bruegel
It is hard to think of a more discussed issue globally that U.S.-China strategic competition. At the same time, the European Union, with a GDP comparable to that of China or the United States, has become increasingly sidelined in this debate.
There are a number of reasons for this. The first is Europe’s limited hard power notwithstanding its large market. The second is its own fragmentation. Europe not being a nation means many things for the question at stake.
First of all, foreign policy is still a national prerogative, even if with some coordination, which anyway requires unanimity. This basically means that the EU does not really have tools to ensure a united front as a response to U.S.-China great power competition.
Having said that, the EU remains the largest economic block beyond the United States and China, which also means that both Washington and Beijing have a keen interest in bringing this bloc on their side. If it were not for the fragmentation of European interests, this could immediately translate into leverage.
Moving to a more normative statement, for the EU to be able to influence U.S.-China rivalry, the EU needs to integrate further, especially in the realm of foreign policy. This is easier said than done and, thus, remains a key challenge for the future of the union.
François HeisbourgSenior advisor for Europe at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
The short answer is yes.
Key aspects of the U.S.-China rivalry are areas of European strength: Europe, meaning here the EU, and countries belonging to its “normative area” (for example Norway, Switzerland, but not the UK) still represent the world’s largest trading bloc and the prime source of standards in technological relations notably in IT. Furthermore, EU institutions exercise influence in this field as a unit. European-based firms also hold key positions in global value chains, notably in the high-end semiconductor ecosystem, where Dutch companies in particular play a big role.
With the creation in 2021 of the EU-U.S. Trade and Technology Council, the basic instrument exists to thrash out many of these issues. The questions then become: how does the EU want to use its assets, notably in terms of devising joint norms and policies with the United States? And is Washington ready to engage in “friend-shoring,” that is, treating firms in allied countries in a manner akin to its domestic technological-industrial base? Or will it use the confrontation with China as a protectionist vehicle for domestic retrenchment?
In parallel, the adoption of Indo-Pacific strategies by the EU and key member states is a notable development, but of limited strategic and military weight in the region.
Jennifer KavanaghSenior fellow in the American Statecraft Program of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
By doubling down on its economic strength and diplomatic skill, the EU can serve as a bridge and balancer, reducing the escalation risk from an increasingly acrimonious U.S.-China rivalry.
The EU has far-reaching diplomatic capital and successful experience acting as a broker in high-stakes situations where U.S. relations are fraught, including with Iran in 2015 and after Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008. With U.S.-Chinese communication less frequent, the EU’s role as interlocutor will be vital to keeping China involved with the international community on global challenges, including the war in Ukraine. So far, the EU has maintained these communication channels, with the EU-China summit and visits to China by German Prime Minister Olaf Scholz and European Council President Charles Michel. Sustained—or increased—EU diplomatic activity could prevent future crises.
The EU’s other geopolitical asset is its economic market. The union is right to limit economic dependence on China but should not follow the U.S. decoupling path. The EU is a primary driver of global economic norms—the “Brussels effect”—and can use this regulatory power to balance the U.S. approach with a more moderate strategy in many sectors.
Using China’s interest in EU markets as leverage, the EU can push China toward EU-set, globally accepted standards without sanctions or restrictions that risk tipping the world into economic blocs.
Tim RühligSenior research fellow at the Center for Geopolitics, Geoeconomics, and Technology of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
The European Union and the United States share a similar perspective on China’s role in the world. However, the policy conclusions they draw are different. The EU is more inclined to cooperate and sees China less as an existential threat. Can Europe influence the U.S.-China rivalry?
Generally, Europe is well placed to do so because it is a crucial factor to both sides. The main advantage of the United States over China is that it has close allies and partners, including the EU. Europe is in a security alliance with the United States and both share the same values. There is no equidistance in the relations with the two great powers.
The EU is also crucial to China. Not only is Europe an indispensable trade partner but it is also more open to much-needed technology cooperation than the United States.
But Europe does not untap its potential to shape the U.S.-China rivalry. The EU has arrived at a relatively consistent China policy. Such unity does not exist at member state level. Europe is too diverse in terms of policy, but also regarding envisioning its relations with China. Without clarifying what role Europe wants China to play, the EU will not be a factor.
Andrew SmallSenior transatlantic fellow with the Asia program at the German Marshall Fund of the United States
Although European leaders describe their competition with China as “systemic,” they regularly lapse into treating the dynamic as a great power contest between Beijing and Washington instead. This framing undercuts Europe’s capacity to shape the wider system rivalry that is underway, positioning it as a troubled bystander rather than a real protagonist.
The economic and security challenges that China poses cut across the advanced industrial democracies. From 5G to semiconductor export controls, major U.S. policy decisions increasingly require allies to be on board if they are to be effective. Yet Europeans have been reluctant to take up the Biden administration’s offer to co-devise a broader collective policy framework for China. Progress with efforts such as the EU-U.S. Trade and Technology Council is modest, piecemeal, and lacking in urgency. Europe’s approach remains reactive, lagging behind most U.S. initiatives, and reflexively stresses points of differentiation—often straw men such as “decoupling.”The advantage this offers is the evasion of responsibility: European leaders can point fingers at Washington and make pained faces, even as they largely end up aligning with U.S. positions. The cost is in squandering ample opportunities for influence during the most critical phase of the West’s policy transition on China.
Tommy SteinerPolicy director at the Sino-Israel Global Network and Academic Leadership (SIGNAL)
Yes. Europe has considerable agency with regard to China and the U.S.-China rivalry, but exercising it would require abandoning its geostrategic “tunnel vision.”
Western strategic thinking tends to focus on fixed regional settings—be it Europe, the Indo-Pacific, or the Middle East—implicitly assuming that each regional theater operates separately. Consequently, the allocation of resources—be it military deployments, financial commitments, or policy attention—is viewed as sort of an inter-regional zero-sum game. If anything, the war in Ukraine and its global implications ought to have ingrained the understanding that the Atlantic and Indo-Pacific arenas are essentially one front.
Europe’s tunnel vision might exact a cost. For instance, it has so far allowed China’s inroads into the Mediterranean and the Middle East to go largely unnoticed. Left unaddressed, China could possibly turn much of the region into a sphere of influence “with Chinese characteristics.” To realize its agency and secure its interests in the global rivalry, Europe must stop treating concepts such as NATO’s new 360 degrees principle as a mere papering-over instrument intended to pacify southern allies. After all, if Europe and the Indo-Pacific are linked, it stands to reason that the landmass connecting both, the Middle East, is as strategically relevant.
This blog is part of the Transatlantic Relations in Review series. Carnegie Europe is grateful to the U.S. Mission to the EU for its support.
