The Complex Reality of Great Power Competition in the Middle East

In the collective memories of people across the Middle East and North Africa, great power rivalries have shaped the region’s fate at multiple critical junctures. In the first part of the twentieth century, following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, colonial competition between Britain and France created the modern borders and nation-states of the Middle East. Toward the end of the century and after five Arab-Israeli wars, crucial peace treaties and multilateral negotiations were mediated by great powers, particularly the United States.

The 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait precipitated the permanent stationing of U.S. troops in the Middle East. A chain of subsequent events—including the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001—culminated in the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and established the United States as the dominant power in the Middle East and North Africa. However, Washington soon found itself drowning in successive geopolitical crises resulting from growing Iranian influence, the rise of nonstate actors, the persistence of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and increasing doubts among America’s allies about its security commitments.

Today’s Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is at the core of the competition between the United States and its great power rivals, China and Russia. China has grown increasingly preoccupied with securing energy supplies from the Gulf. Russia has been invested in protecting the few allies it has in the region and in disrupting the U.S.-led regional security architecture.

All three powers understand both the geostrategic significance of the region and the risks it poses to world peace and security, as well as the economic opportunities and young populations that will shape its future. All of this has drawn the world’s great powers to the region in search of military presence, security allies, trade partners, market shares, and investment opportunities.

The powers’ successes have varied, creating a complex geostrategic map that does not lend itself to sweeping generalizations. But in a new project for Carnegie, we compiled and examined a variety of data sources to explore the ways that the United States, China, and Russia have bilaterally engaged Arab League countries as well as Iran, Israel, and Türkiye between 2012 and 2022. We focused on four indicators—trade, foreign direct investment, arms exports, and military deployment—to show trends of engagement. Overall, the project presents a unique, comprehensive view of the great power competition within MENA that further illustrates the region’s textured, nuanced relationships.

In recent years, much talk in U.S. policy circles has centered around the pivot to Asia and the low return on America’s continued involvement in the MENA region. Conventional wisdom in Washington has often described recent U.S.–Middle East posturing as signaling “retreat” or “withdrawal,” while wary of how China or Russia may take advantage of the “vacuum” left behind.

The 2023 Beijing-brokered détente between Iran and Saudi Arabia is often cited as evidence for the shift. However, our database reveals the need for a more nuanced analysis, as different engagement patterns have emerged that vary from one MENA country to another and from one MENA subregion to another.

Take the Arabian Peninsula. From oil-exporting Saudi Arabia to war-torn Yemen, this MENA subregion has been in the global spotlight in recent years. It is home to international trading chokepoints such as the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Strait of Hormuz, vital yet vulnerable undersea cables in the Red Sea, and top oil-producing countries. Recent attacks on international shipping from Ansar Allah (also known as the Houthis) on have illustrated the peace and security challenges emanating from this subregion. Disruptions in the Red Sea have had significant implications for all great powers: The United States and its allies have seen shipping costs from China to ports along the Mediterranean Sea rise by 44 percent in December 2023, as a result of the Houthi attacks. Russia’s oil exports to India have also been impacted as a result of hindered access to the Suez Canal.

In this subregion, the influence of the three great powers and their interactions with regional actors defy any simplistic explanation. While Washington does not need to worry about its diplomatic and security engagement with the Gulf countries, other elements of geostrategic influence are becoming spheres of contestation with Beijing and Moscow.

The sheer number of state-to-state interactions such as bilateral visits—including in either country or at a third location—between the United States and Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, and Yemen between 2012 to 2022 exceeded the combined number of visits between Russia, China, and these aforementioned states. Even as Russian President Vladmir Putin claimed that his country’s relations with the UAE were at an “unprecedented high level,” the number of bilateral meetings between the two still trailed behind the United States.

Yet, the economic ties—especially in terms of trade—between China and the subregion have significantly increased. Many factors may help explain this jump: Increased trade relations may not necessarily correspond to warmer diplomatic relations but may stem from practical needs. Chinese President Xi Jinping has repeatedly stressed the importance of energy security, as Chinese oil demand continues to grow. The decrease of trade volume between the United States and many Gulf countries, on the other hand, may be partly explained by the U.S. shale boom.

Aside from trade relations, U.S. security ties with the Arabian Peninsula have certainly strengthened between 2012 and 2022. U.S. arms exports to Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE in 2022 far exceeded its exports to these countries a decade ago. The estimated volume of arms transfers from the United States to Kuwait was more than ninety times greater in 2022 compared to 2012. Comparatively, arms exports from China to the subregion remained relatively stagnant. On top of arms exports, the United States is the only country out of the three with military bases and significant troop deployment to the region.

Despite perceptions of a U.S. retreat from the Middle East and concerns over a vacuum potentially filled by China or Russia, the reality of engagement is more textured and complex. The data show varied patterns of influence and interaction, revealing that while trade with China has indeed surged, the United States retains robust diplomatic and security ties across the Arabian Peninsula. Moreover, the ongoing strategic importance of the region to global peace and security calls for a nuanced understanding of the multi-aligned Middle East.